ry - By Corps order of 24 February the
division was assigned an assault role, given a zone of action in
the center with the 4th Marine Division on the right and 5th
Marine Division on the left, and assigned the mission of seizing
the line O-2, (See Enclosure B (2)) which extended generally
along the high ground overlooking Airfield No. 3. in its zone of
action.  The 21st Marines, attached to the 4th Marine Division,
occupied this zone of action on the left of the 4th Marine
Division.  The Division CP has been established just north of
Airfield No 1 on 24 February.  Only one battery of the 12th
Marines having been landed by the morning of 25 February, the 1st
Bn, 14th Marines and the 4th Bn, 13th Marines were attached to
the division.  These two battalions functioned under control of
the 12th Marines, whose headquarters had been established ashore.
The 1st Bn, 14th Marines was placed in direct support of the 9th
Marines, which was to make the attack in the division zone of
action by passing through the 21st Marines, and the 4th Bn, 13th
Marines was assigned the mission of reinforcing the fires of the
1st Bn, 14th Marines.  At 0700 the 3d Tank Bn was attached to the
9th Marines and the 21st Marines reverted to 3d Marine Division
control.  by 0830 the 9th Marines had moved from the bivouac area
assigned it on landing and closed in its assembly area for the
attack.  (See Enclosure B(1).  Situation at 0830, 25 February).
At 0930 the 9th Marines passed through the 21st Marines and
launched its attack with the 1st and 2d Bns abreast, 1st Bn on
the right, making its main effort on the left, in  conjunction
with the 4th and 5th Marine Divisions.  the attack was preceded
by a 45 minute preparation by one 155mm  battalion of Corps
artillery with preparatory fires by the 1st Bn, 14th Marines and
4th Bn, 13th Marines as requested by the 9th Marines.  Machine
guns, 37mm guns, and 60mm mortars of the 21st Marines supported
the attack of the 9th Marines until their fire was masked.  The
81mm mortar platoons of the 21st Marines were attached to the 9th
Marines.  Both runways of Airfield No. 2 crossed the division
zone of action directly to the front of the 9th Marines,
providing perfect fields of fire for enemy machine guns and
antitank guns across the division zone of action.  The two
runways were commanded by high ground immediately to the north.
The key ground in the division zone of action was the hills in
TAs 199-O and 200-P which commanded the entire zone of action.
Enemy emplacements, many of reinforced concrete, were located in
TAs 182-A and B, 199-S, T, and 200-P immediately in front of the
line of departure.  The 1st Bn, on the right made good progress
initially, but the 2d Bn on the left was taken under heavy fire
from enemy emplacements to its front and left flank and made
little progress.  Tanks were moved on to the runway to support
the attack of the 2d Bn by direct fire on located enemy
emplacements.  The tanks drew heavy mortar fire which resulted in
a number of casualties to the infantry.  Enemy artillery and
antitank guns, sited down the runways, knocked out nine tanks.
The tanks destroyed several emplacements and at least three guns.
By early afternoon a considerable gap had developed between the
left of the 1st Bn and the right of the 2d Bn, and the 3d Bn, in
regimental reserve, was committed in the gap, attacking generally
north.  The 3d Bn was taken under heavy fire and made little
progress.  Mortar fire was particularly heavy throughout the day.
Upon being disengaged by the advance of the 9th Marines, units of
the 21st Marines were assembled in division reserve south of
Airfield No. 2.  Aviation delivered four strikes in support of
the attack during the day, none in close support.  Naval gunfire
delivered call fires on deep targets beginning at dawn.  by 1700,
when lines were ordered consolidated for the night, the situation
was as shown on Enclosure B (2), Situation at 1700, 25 February.
Gaps were closed for night defense with support and reserve
units.