26 February. - It was now clear that the division was
confronting the hostile main battle position which apparently
extended generally northwest to southeast across the island along
the high ground to the front.  The high ground commanded the
entire southern end of the island as far south as Mt SURIBACHI,
including Airfield No. 1.  As long as the enemy held this ridge,
he would be able to place observed fires on our reserve areas and
rear installations.  This he had been doing, though not in the
volume of which he was capable, doubtless due to the fear of his
guns and mortars being picked up by aviation and taken under fire
by artillery and naval guns.  The heavily organized enemy
position clearly indicated the massing of all available artillery
fire directly in front of the infantry and moving it ahead  of
the advance by successive concentrations.  On 25 February,
however, only Batteries A, C, and F of the 12th Marines were
ashore and ready to fire.  These were formed into a provisional
battalion.  The 1st Bn, 14th Marines was released to the 5th
Marine Division in accordance with Corps order.  the 9th Marines
with previous attachments, plus the 3d Bn, 21st Marines, launched
its attack at 0800 in conjunction with the 4th and 5th Marine
Divisions.  The 1st and 2d Bns were again abreast, 1st on the
right, with the 1st making the main effort.  Corps artillery
(155mm How) fired a 600 round preparation from 0715 to 0800.  The
provisional battalion of the 12th Marines, in direct support of
the 9th Marines, and the 4th Bn, 13th Marines, reinforcing the
fires of the 12th Marines, delivered fires as requested by the
9th Marines.  The 9th Marines again received heavy mortar,
artillery, and small arms fire in its attempt to cross Airfield
No. 2 and seize the high ground to the north of it, and progress
made during the day was negligible.  Tanks were again employed as
assault guns and eleven were knocked out.  The 3d Bn, 9th Marines
remained in position in regimental reserve after the attack
jumped off and occupied a defensive position just north of the
East-West runway.  The 3d Bn, 21st Marines remained in 9th
Marines reserve in its assembly area south of Airfield No. 2.
Naval gunfire was again employed on deep targets spotted by
aircraft, and on suspected gun and mortar positions as called for
by infantry units.  Eight bombers and eight fighters were on
station throughout the day and executed four missions for ground
troops, none of them in close support.  This line-up of aircraft
prevailed throughout the operation and was entirely inadequate to
meet the requirements of the situation.  A much larger number of
aircraft employed in mass against targets holding up the advance
of the infantry was clearly indicated.  The situation at 1700 was
as shown in Enclosure B (3), Situation at 1700, 26 February.  Co
L, 9th Marines, was attached to the 1st Bn to close the gap
between the 1st Bn and the 4th Marine Division.  this attachment
was effected at the conclusion of the attack about 1600.