3 March - 1.  During the night of 2 march an enemy sketch of
the defensive area in front of the Division (largely in the zone
of action of the 9th Marines), was captured by the 21st Marines,
was received and translated at the Division Command Post.  It
could not be determined whether the defensive area was the
enemy's entire final defensive area of just one sector of it.
Reports of the 21st Marines on 2 March indicated a strong enemy
position in the vicinity of TA 235-U, and enemy resistance to the
east and southwest thereof in front of the 2d Bn, 21st Marines.
The captured sketch bore out the belief that the 9th Marines were
in contact with a strongly organized enemy position.  It was
hoped that a "soft spot" would be found by the 21st Marines
between this defensive area and the enemy position around TA 235-
U so that a wedge could be driven between the two and the
defensive area in the division zone of action could be flanked.
For detailed map of this defensive area see Enclosure A (5) map,
Enemy defensive dispositions east of Airfield No. 3 as translated
from map captured by 21st Mariners.  For outline of defensive
area see Enclosure B (11), Situation at 1430, 3 March.

               2.  The attack was launched at 0800 with the same
formation but with a new boundary between regiments.  It was
preceded by a 10-minute preparation by the division artillery and
direct support destroyers which was followed by a rolling barrage
lifted 100 yards every seven minutes for 200 yards.  The 9th
Marines was again unable to advance.  In the 21st Marines zone of
action, the 3d Bn, 9th Marines maintained its position.  by Corps
order, the 5th Marine Division was to extend to the northeast and
relieve the 3d Bn, 9th Marines which was in the 5th Marine
Division zone of action.  The 2d Bn, 21st Marines advanced slowly
under heavy fire and by 1145 had secured a foothold on the high
ground at TA 218-D.  Relief of the 3d Bn, 9th Marines by units of
the 5th Marine Division was slow as elements of both became
engaged in fire fights while effecting the relief.  by 1430 the
situation was as shown on Enclosure B (12), Situation at 1430, 3
March.

t was believed that no great amount of
resistance remained in front of the 2d Bn, 21st Marines, though
it received heavy fire from the high ground to its left in the
5th Marine Division zone of action.  The decision was made to
change the direction of attack by assigning a new boundary
between regiments in order to attack in flank the enemy defensive
area in front of the 9th Marines.  AT 1500 a coordinated attack
was launched to the southeast with the main effort on the left,
employing the same formation.  The 1st Bn, 21st Marines was
released to the complete control of the 21st Marines and moved
into position in rear of the 2d Bn, 21st Marines to launch an
attack to the southeast with the mission of seizing hill 362 (TA
219-U).  The 2d Bn, 21st Marines was to continue the advance to
the northeast to the O-3 line.  Cos K and L of the 3d Bn, 9th
Marines had at this time been relieved by elements of the 5th
Marine Division.  Co K was attached to the 1st Bn, 21st Marines,
and Co L was attached to the 2d Bn, 21st Marines, which was
greatly depleted as a result of heavy casualties.  The 9th
Marines attacked with the 1st and 2d Bns abreast, 1st on the
right.  The 3d Bn, 21st Marines remained in 9th Marines reserve
with the proviso that it was not to be committed without division
authority.  The attack was preceded by a five minute preparation
by artillery and naval gunfire.  The 1st Bn, 21st Marines made
rapid progress initially but was finally halted by heavy fire
from the high ground to its front.  The 2d Bn, 21st Marines
seized the high ground in TA 218-D but was unable to advance
further because of heavy flanking fire which came from the high
ground in the 5th Marine Division zone of action.  One platoon of
tanks of 21st Marines, from positions in the vicinity of MOTOYAMA
village, effectively supported the attack of the 1st Bn, 21st
Marines by placing direct fire on enemy targets in front of that
battalion.  The 9th Marines was again unable to advance.  Tanks
were being used singly and in small groups in the broken terrain
to its front by the 9th Marines and though they knocked out a
number of enemy emplacements and some guns, they were unable to
breach this enemy position sufficiently to permit advance of the
infantry.  A number of enemy antitank guns were located in this
position and several were sited to deliver converging fire on CR
-325 (TA 201-B.  A number of our tanks were knocked out before
this position was finally reduced.  For a detailed report of tank
operations, see Enclosure H, Action Report, 3d Tank Battalion.  T
1800 the situation was as shown on Enclosure B (13), Situation at
1800, 3 march.

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