4 March -1.  The Corps attack was set for 0815 this date.
Division Orders called for the 3d Bn, 21st Marines to be released
to the 21st Marines and to move prior to daylight to be passed
through the 1st Bn, 21st Marines and continue the attack to the
southeast to seize Hill 362 (TA 219-U).  At approximately 0300 an
estimated 200 enemy troops made an infiltration attempt in the
gap between the 2d Bn, 9th Marines and the 1st Bn, 21st Marines
at the eastern end of Airfield No. 3.  After a sharp fight, the
brunt of which was borne by the left company of the 2d Bn, 9th
Marines, the enemy was repulsed with heavy casualties.  The 2d
Bn, 9th Marines suffered numerous casualties also.  Reports
indicated some enemy troops had succeeded in infiltrating our
lines and were seen moving along the airfield.  Patrols were sent
forward to the airfield and in rear of the 1st and 2d Bns, 9th
Marines by the 3d Bn, 21st Marines.  The 3d Bn, 21st Marines
which was under orders to commence moving at 0400, was ordered to
remain in place and continue patrolling until after daylight when
the situation could be clarified. Patrols of the 3d Bn, 21st
Marines killed two or three enemy troops by daylight and the
situation was found to be satisfactory.

               2.  Permission was secured from Corps to delay the
attack of the division until the 3d Bn, 21st Marines was in
position to attack.  The 3d Bn, 21st Marines commenced movement
at 0645, at which time it reverted to the 21st Marines.  A
circuitous rout was taken to avoid enemy fire which was heavy in
the forward area.  Even so, in crossing the are northwest and
north of Airfield No. 3, the battalion was taken under fire of
enemy mortars and small arms and considerably delayed, finally
arriving in position at 1100.  Visibility was extremely poor
which delayed and hindered preparations for the passage of lines.
At 1140 the division attack was launched following the same
scheme of maneuver as on the previous day, with the exception
that the 3d Bn, 21st Marines was passed through by the 1st Bn,
21st Marines.  A twenty minute preparation by the division
artillery with thirty minutes on deeper targets by direct support
destroyers was fired, and was followed by a rolling barrage
lifted one hundred yards every seven minutes for 200 yards.  The
9th Marines was again unable to dent the enemy position to its
front.  Strong resistance was met by the 21st Marines, including
direct fire from artillery pieces which were difficult to locate,
and little progress was made.  The 2d Bn, 21st Marines, still
unable to advance because of hostile flanking fire from the high
ground to its left in the 5th Marine Division zone of action,
also suffered numerous casualties from a hostile field piece
firing direct fire in enfilade of its line from a position in the
vicinity of 219-K or L.  Efforts to definitely locate and knock
this piece out with artillery fire had been unsuccessful.  Relief
of the 3d Bn, 9th Marines by units of the 5th Marine Division was
completed in the morning and Co I was assembled in rear of the
line.  The battalion, less Co. K, attached to the 1st Bn 21st
Marines, was moved into position southwest of MOTOYAMA village in
division reserve.  The 1st Bn, 21st Marines, after being passed
through by the 3d Bn, 21st Marines, was withdrawn to the vicinity
of RJ-330 (TA-218-H) where Co K was released to control of the 3d
Bn, 9th Marines in its reserve position.  Co B was attached to
the 2d Bn, 21st Marines.  The 1st Bn, 21st Marines (less Co B)
was assigned as regimental reserve, the battalion headquarters
and Co A moving into position in the area 199-S, T, and Y.  Co C
remained in the vicinity of RJ-330 and was employed to cover the
gap between the 9th and 21st Marines when lines were consolidated
at 1445 and moved to the vicinity of TA 217-V, 200-B.  At 1800
the situation was as shown on Enclosure b (14), Situation at
1800, 4 March.