9 March - The division continued the attack at 0700 employing the same scheme of 
maneuver.  A ten-minute artillery preparation was placed in the zone of action 
of the 9th Marines prior to the attack.  The 3d Bn, 9th Marines continued to 
advance toward the beach against sporadic but stubborn enemy resistance and by 
1700 and penetrated to the beach area.  This battalion called one air strike in 
the area TA 219-S, which had been a troublesome spot for the past two days.  The 
2d Bn, 9th Marines with effective assistance from tanks, continued to mop up 
enemy elements in its immediate vicinity.  During the morning, Co C, 1st Bn, 9th 
Marines was disengaged and rejoined its battalion in division reserve.  The 3d 
Bn, 21st Marines, employing tanks, attacked the enemy pocket to its front but 
made no progress.  Only one tank at a time could be employed in this terrain.  
The enemy destroyed one of our tanks by firing air bursts over the tank to 
disperse the infantry, and covering by smoke the approach to the tank of a 
demolition detachment which knocked out the tank with a demolition charge and 
Molotov cocktail.  Resistance in this pocket was passive but extremely 
tenacious.  The 1st Bn, 21st Marines advanced to the edge of the cliff 
overlooking the beach against negligible resistance and sent patrols down on the 
beach to the waterline where no resistance was encountered.  Fire, however, was 
received in the beach area from the 5th Marine Division zone of action and the 
battalion maintained its position on the cliff.  The 2d Bn, 21st Marines 
advanced its right flank to tie-in with the 1st Bn, 21st Marines.  A destroyer 
was employed during the day, with the Division Naval Gunfire Officer aboard, to 
fire on caves and enemy positions located in the beach area.  This was believed 
to have been quite effective. Infantry battalions were now definitely beginning 
to feel the presence of the large number of replacements, manifested by a sharp 
drop in combat efficiency.  These men were found to be willing but very poorly 
trained, especially in basic individual conduct.  The faulty teamwork, resulting 
from lack of small unit training, was also a definite hindrance to the operation 
of the infantry battalions.  Many needless casualties occurred in these 
replacements because of a lack of knowledge of the proper use of cover and 
concealment.  At 1800 the situation was as shown on Enclosure B (19), Situation 
at 1800, 9 March.