FROM 0900, 19 FEB 45 TO 1800, 19 FEB 45 (D-DAY) (a) Elements of TF 54, reinforced by elements of TF 58, opened fire at sunrise in assigned areas of responsibility. Beginning at H-45 all fires were intensified in scheduled series along the beaches and on the Division right flank, concentrating along the beaches from H-15 to H-3, thereupon initiating a rolling barrage forward of the assault forces. Shifting progressively 200 yards inland, fires were 400 yards from the beach when the first wave landed. (b) B-24's of CTF 94 bombed the objective at 0730. From H-55 to H-35 support aircraft of CTF 58 and CTG 52.2 struck the flanks and the landing beaches. From H-5 to about H-2 these units repeated their attacks on the flanks and beaches, strafing inland 200 yards in advance of the assault troops. (c) After the above Naval and Air bombardment, the 4th Marine Division (Reinforced) landed at 0902 on Beaches Yellow and Blue with the mission of seizing O-1 in its zone of action, and protecting the right (NE) flank of the Corps, then on Corps order seize O-2, prepared for further operations to seize the remainder of IWO JIMA within its one, in order to assist in securing that Island and destroying the enemy thereon. (d) Initial resistance was moderate but increased in intensity as units advanced inland. No obstacles and only few land mines were encountered on the beaches, but the entire zone of action of the Division was subjected to heavy artillery, rocket, mortar, machine gun and rifle fire throughout the day, causing many casualties, particularly along the beaches. The fire from these weapons was delivered from commanding ground and from well-concealed, well emplaced concrete pillboxes, blockhouses, and caves. (e) Inland from Yellow Beaches to Airfield No. 1 to advance on troops and movement of vehicles was impeded by loose volcanic sand, abrupt terraces, and a generally steep slope from the water's edge to the rim of Airfield No. 1. (f) Egress from Blue Beach was similar, and in addition, on the extreme right of the zone the entire area of both Blue and Yellow beaches was dominated by sheer cliffs rising above quarries, necessitating hazardous envelopments from the left and right in order to neutralize those heights. (g) RCT 23 landed on Yellow Beaches at 0902 with two battalions abreast, 1/23 on the left and 2/23 on the right. The attack of this Combat Team was of necessity a direct frontal assault against well-organized positions on commanding ground. AT 1655 orders were issued to BLT 2/24 to pass through BLT 2/23 in order to seize the edge of the Airfield. The passage of lines in this instance was postponed until just prior to darkness because of the initiation of an advance by BLT 2/23 to the Airfield. Relief by RLT 2/24 was completed by 1915. (h) RCT 25 landed on Beach Blue 1 at 0902 with two battalions abreast, 1/25 on the left and 3/25 on the right. Because of the restricted beach area (Beach "Blue 2 being untenable for a landing), the right battalion landed in column of companies. This RCT had the difficult mission not only of landing on a narrow front, but also of delivering a frontal attack with the left battalion, as the right battalion, preparing for the envelopment of the heights, executed a turning movement to the right to secure Beach Blue 2. Casualties were excessive, necessitating the passage of reserve battalions of both RCT's through assault units. The Commanding General, in order no to allay the momentum of the attack, ordered two BLT's of the Division Reserve, RCT 24, to land and to support the attack. BLT 1/24 landed on Blue Beaches at 1632 and was attached to RCT 25. BLT 2/24 landed at 1650 and was attached to RCT 23 as noted above. RCT 24, less two BLT's, completed landing at 2030 and assembled in TA's 165 O and 166 FG as Division Reserve. (1) 14th Marines. 1/14 in direct support of RCT 25, landed and was in position at 1700. 2/14 in direct support of RCT 23, landed and was in position at 2130. The Artillery Regiment less these two battalions remained afloat. (j) 4th Tank Battalion. Company "C", in normal attachment to RCT 23, began landing from LSM's on Yellow Beaches at 0940. Because of difficulties at the beach and inland the company did not complete landing until 1300. Considerable difficulty was experienced in negotiating the loose sand; as a result of that and enemy fire many tanks became inoperative. Because RCT 23 anticipated the need for additional tanks to knock out pillboxes holding up the advance, one platoon of Company "B" was attached to Company "C". Company "A", attached to RCT 25, began landing from LSM's on Blue Beaches at 1017. Although the terrain inland from these beaches was somewhat favorable for the operation of tanks than was that of Yellow Beaches, many mines were encountered causing delay in the commitment of the entire company. Because of initial losses and slightly more favorable terrain, Company "B", less one platoon, was attached to Company "A" during the afternoon. (k) Call fires were delivered by ships assigned to assault battalions. VOF planes, employed with organic ship spot planes, augmented the search for the location of enemy artillery. 'counterbattery fires against both AA and artillery positions predominated. (l) Although the penetration was not as deep as had been planed, the landing was successful. The combination of a well organized and determined defense and extremely rough terrain retarded the progress of the attack., but by late afternoon the assault elements had reached the edge of Airfield No. 1, and had made considerable progress towards the capture of the high ground on the right flank (See, Map, Progress of Attack). (m) At 1700 all units were ordered to consolidate positions on the most favorable ground, prepared to continue the attack at 0830, 20 February, 1945. (n) Weather and Visibility. The weather was fair, visibility good, except where impaired by smoke drifting across the beaches from the northwest.