FROM 1800, 19 FEB 45 TO 1800, 20 FEB 45 (D PLUS 1) (a) During the night units consolidated positions, established firm contact and made preparations for continuing the attack the following morning. Contact was maintained with the enemy during the night. All units received mortar and artillery fire, but otherwise the night was generally quiet, with no other activity to the front. BLT 2/24, attached to RCT 23, relieved BLT 2/23 in the line at 1915, BLT 2/23 reverted to RCT 23 Reserve. (b) Because BLT 3/25 had sustained approximately 50% casualties, and because complete relief over such rugged terrain was impracticable, two companies of BLT 1/24, which was attached to RCT 25, were attached to BLT 3/25 in the line at 1845 and 2053 respectively. (c) Assigned units of TF 54, reinforced by elements of TF 58, provided illumination and harassing fires during the night. (d) Black Cat night observers were employed but were unable to carry out missions effectively because of bad weather and other reasons discussed elsewhere. (e) Supported by CTF 54 and elements of CTF 58 firing a coordinated naval gunfire preparation from K-15 to K-hour, and by two direct support artillery battalions furnishing local preparation fires for each assault RCT, the Division continued the attack in accordance with VAC LANFOR order, at King-hour, 0830, to seize O-1. There was no change in boundaries or formation; the Line of Departure was the present front lines. (f) Progress was made initially on the left, but intense machine gun, heavy mortar and artillery fire halted the advance during the afternoon. Little progress was made on the right. (g) RCT 23, With BLT 3/23 on the left, BLT 2/24 on the right, and BLT's 1/23 and 2/23 in reserve, jumped off at the following hours: 3/23 at 0830, and 2/24 delayed for 15 minutes while waiting for tanks to support the attack, at 0845. The northern and eastern extremities of Airfield No. 1 was secured after a slow and bitterly contested advance. Upon the request of the 4th Division, VAC LANFOR ordered elements of the 2d Bomb Disposal Company to land at 1517 and to report immediately to RCT 23, reporting to the 4th Engineer Battalion when its duty with RCT 23 was completed. (h) RCT 25, with 1/25, 2/25 and 1/24 in line and 3/25 in reserve continued the attack on the left at 0855 in conjunction with RCT 23. Little progress was made by this Combat Team, since it was imperative that it conform to the advance of RCT 23. Due to difficulty in distinguishing boundaries on the ground, BLT 1/25 fought most of the day in the zone of RCT 23. BLT 2/24, attached to RCT 23, assumed control of this area at 1630. One platoon of Company "B", 4th Engineer Battalion was attached to BLT 1/24 for the period and operated with RCT 25. (i) RCT 24, Less two BLT's, remained in an assembly area in TA's 166 FG and 165 O as Division Reserve. (j) The 14th Marines, less 4/14, completed landing at 1730. Battalions immediately went into position and registered to support the attack. (k) 4th Tank Battalion. Companies "A" and "B" (less 1 platoon), attached to RCT 25, remained on call most of the day while Engineers removed land mines obstructing the advance. Company "C" (plus 1 platoon of Company "B") supported the advance of RCT 23, destroying pillboxes, automatic weapons and gun positions. (l) Naval Gunfire. Units of CTF 54 and elements of CTF 58 continued to support the action with normal fires. Throughout the day fires were intense, with all ships searching for enemy gun and mortar positions. Fires were restricted about 1500, as the cloud cover after that time hindered float and VOF planes. (m) Aircraft from the above units executed support missions. Search and attack patrols were instituted by CASCU as requested by the Division. Day and night tactical observers were employed together with NGF and artillery air spotters. VMO-4 did not operate. Air support began securing at 1515. (n) Although combat efficiency was reduced by casualties, the capture of Airfield No. 1 was completed by 1600, and ad advance of 200 to 1000 yards had been made across the Division front. (o) At 1630, upon VAC LANFOR order, units were ordered to consolidate positions on the most favorable ground, prepared to continue the attack at 0810, 21 February, 1945. Particular attention was directed toward anti- mechanized defense and firm contact between units right and left. (p) Weather and Visibility. Weather fair and visibility good during morning. In the afternoon clouds and rain decreased the visibility.