FROM 1800, 20 FEB 45 TO 1800, 21 FEB 45 (D PLUS 2) (a) Because of enemy activity and troop movements along the entire front, RCT 24 (less 2 BLT's), the Division Reserve, was ordered at 2015 to be prepared to be committed on short notice in the zones of action of either RCT 23 or RCT 25. (b) Rockets or heavy mortars were reported falling in the zones of action of each Combat Team and in rear areas. Since this fire supposedly was coming not only from the front but from the rear in the vicinity of Suribachi, the 5th Marine Division artillery was requested to execute counter-battery fire on positions in the Suribachi area. RCT 23 reported enemy tanks in the vicinity of TA 181 S; artillery fires were requested, and the tanks were either destroyed or dispersed. (c) At 0443 RCT 25 repulsed an attempted infiltration by approximately 100 Japs; the lines remained intact and all the enemy were killed. (d) Naval Gunfire. Units of CTF 54 and CTF 58 maintained illumination and intensive harassing and defensive fires throughout the night in an attempt to reduce enemy shelling to a minimum. (e) Night air observers furnished one flight, returning to base o account of bad weather. (f) 14th Marines. 4/14 completed landing and was in position and registering at 0638. Four guns were operative. Seven had been lost in the sinking of DUKW's, and one was ineffective because of defective sights. (g) Following a coordinated artillery and naval gunfire preparation from King- hour minus 20 to King-hour plus 20, and a prepared air strike (Plan VICTOR) from King-hour plus 20 to King-hour plus 40, with air on call prior to King-hour, the Division continued the attack at 0810, in accordance with LANFOR Order No. 1-45, to seize O-2. (h) The boundary between the 4th and 5th Divisions was the present boundary extended, inclusive to the 5th Division, and the boundary between Regiments was as shown on the map, Progress of Attack. (i) Substantial gains were made initially on the right, but further progress was held up by extensive minefields, intense artillery, mortar, automatic weapons, and sniper fire. An advance of approximately 500 yards was made on the extreme left of the Division zone of action. (j) RCT 23, with BLT 2/23 (? 3/23) on the left and BLT 2/24 o the right, BLT's 1/23 and 3/23 following at 600 yards, continued the attack at King-hour. The advance against numerous pillboxes and extensive minefields was extremely costly and very slow. All minefields were expertly covered by mortar, artillery and machine gun fire. advance was made only on the left of the RCT zone, where slightly defiladed areas permitted local and restricted envelopments. Maximum use was made of all supporting weapons. Because of the difficult and unusual terrain it was necessary for mutual contact to be established on the left between BLT 1/27 and RCT 23. (k) RCT 25, with BLT's 1/25, 2/25, 1/24 in line, and 3/25 in reserve, continued the attack at King-hour. BLT 1/24 held in its initial position until 0930 in order to straighten lines. The attack of the RCT was held up initially by minefields laid in rough terrain and by sniper, artillery and heavy mortar fire. Under constant pressure, resistance gradually weakened in the center, and gains varied from 50 to 300 yards. At 1430 BLT 3/25 was committed between BLT 1/25 and BLT 2/25. This move was necessary because of a gap which had developed between the two BLT's. One (1) company of BLT 3/25 and one (1) company of BLT 1/24 was reconstituted as RCT reserve. (l) RCT 24, less 2 BLT's, continued in Division Reserve in the same location. (m) At 0915 the following message was received from VAC LANFOR: "Prepare receive RCT 21 (3d Mar Div) Yellow Beaches, beginning 1130. Assign assembly area your zone. Will be released to you on your request to assist if required in capture of Airfield No. 2. If and when committed designate one integrated RCT as VAC LANFOR Reserve and assign suitable assembly area." The time date group on the message was 210726. As a result of this message Division requested either the Commanding Officer or the Executive Officer of RCT 21 to report aboard the Division Command Ship for orientation. The RCT Commander so reported. (n) At 0917 RCT 21 was directed to land as ordered, assemble in TA 165 HIKLMQ, and await orders. Upon Division Request, RCT 21 was released to Division control at 1630. The last unit completed landing at 1720, and the entire RCT was in the above assembly area at the close of the period. (o) 14th Marines. 1/14 fired 1500 rounds on preparation, counter-battery and continued supporting the attack of RCT 25. 2/14 fired 463 round on preparation and continued the support of the attack of RCT 23. This battalion also fired 900 rounds on counter-battery fire across the Division front. 3/14 reinforced 1/14 on preparation and counter-battery fires. (p) 4th Tank Battalion. Company "A" and Company "B" (less 1 platoon), attached to RCT 25, supported the advance and were instrumental in driving the enemy from the heights of the quarry and cliff areas on the extreme right of the Division zone. Company "C" (plus 1 platoon), attached to RCT 23, supported the advance but was held up by the enforced slowness of the engineers in removing minefields under heavy fire. (q) Aviation. CTF 58 and CTG 52.2 continued to furnish air missions, and CTF 58 voluntarily increased the size and number of air strikes effectively. AA fire damaged two Division tactical Air Observation planes. Naval Gunfire and Artillery air spotters conducted normal missions. VMO-4 did not operate. (r) Naval Gunfire. Units of CTF 54, reinforced by elements of CTF 58, continued to support the attack. Numerous enemy artillery, mortar and rocket positions were reported silenced or neutralized. Additional elements of CTF 58 arrived in the early morning to reinforce the present naval strength and were assigned sectors of responsibility along with other major units in an "all out" attempt to search out and neutralize enemy artillery and mortar fire. Organic float planes were again reinforced with VOF planes to provide a maximum of observation facilities for firing ships. (s) Amphibious Tractors. The 2d Armored Amphibian Tractor Battalion was assigned to beach defense and the 10th Amphibian Tractor Battalion was utilized to supply all units with ammunition and supplies. (t) Assistant Division Commander. The ADC was ordered to land at 1245 to report on beach conditions and to select a site for the Division CP. He arrived at the CP of RCT 24 at 1255 and reported that although conditions on Beaches Yellow 1 and 2 were still unsatisfactory on account of wreckage of boats and equipment, conditions were improving and beaches were sufficiently open to receive some LCM's and LCVP's. He further reported that Beach Blue 1 was under fire and that an ammunition dump had been hit. Explosions from this dump were endangering both Blue and Yellow Beaches. At 1502 the ADC reported that after consulting with all RCT Commanders he was of the opinion the Division CP should remain aboard the USS BAYFIELD until February 22d. AT 1600 the ADC reported that because of the location of assembly areas of RCT 21 and the general congestion of beaches and inland areas he recommended that RCT 21, instead of relieving RCT 25, as had been previously planned, relieve RCT 23. The Commanding General concurred in the above recommendations. (u) AT 1620 all units were ordered to consolidate present positions for the night at 1700, paying particular attention to contact with adjacent units. (v) AT 1654 the following warning order was issued: "This is a warning order. RCT 21 released to 4th Division. Intend pass 21st through 23d, repeat 23d, tomorrow AM to continue attack present 23 zone. Elements 4th Tank Battalion and 14th Marines, now supporting 23d, will be assigned direct support 21st effective upon relief of 23d. Arrange necessary liaison and reconnaissance prior thereto. Upon relief, intend revert 23d to VAC LANFOR Reserve. RCT 23 recommended assembly area." (w) Combat efficiency, reduced by heavy casualties and battle fatigue, was estimated at the close of the period to be 68%. (x) An advance of 50 to 500 yards had been made across the Division front. The enemy, employing every type of weapon available, was being slowly driven back yard by yard to strongly prepared positions across the center of the Island. (y) Weather and Visibility. The weather was fair and visibility was good.