FROM 1800, 21 FEB TO 1800, 22 FEB 45 (D PLUS 3) (a) During the night units consolidated their positions on the most favorable ground and established contact with units on the flanks. (b) RCT's 21 and 23 carried out preparations to effect the relief indicated in the Warning Order of 211654. (c) RCT 23 reported the following areas in which the Combat Team would assemble upon the relief of RCT 21: TA's 164 E - 165 PQGU. BLT 2/24 was to be assembled in TA's 165 E and 166 A, as requested by RCT 24. (d) RCT 23 reported that 3/23 was receiving a counter-attack in force on its right and that the enemy was converging on RJ 283 in TA 182 P, along the road from NE to E. At 2340 RCT 23 reported that requested Artillery and Naval Gunfire appeared to have dispersed the attack, but that enemy units were still attempting infiltration. AT 0020 small groups were observed and fired on in TA 182 G. (e) In order to be prepared for any eventuality the Division, at 2345, requested permission for VAC LANFOR to use RCT 21, if necessary, to assist in repelling the counter-attack. The request was approved at 0030, with the provision that an equivalent VAC LANFOR Reserve be reconstructed as soon as practicable after the commitment. (f) AT 2325 information was received that the 4th Battalion, 13th Marines, would be available to the 4th Division until 1200, 22 February. (g) At 0300 RCT 25 reported three air bombs were dropped behind its lines. (h) At 0400 VAC LANFOR confirmed flash red from 0316 to 0346. (i) Night air observers did not reach the objective because of the air raid. The Division night air observer's base was damaged and inoperative, necessitating his transfer. (k) At 0630 the Second Section, 1st Provisional Rocket Detachment, was ordered attached to RCT 21 as of 0700. (l) At 0741 the Division requested the Division Control Officer, on board PC(S) 1452, to have LVT(4)'s meet the Advance CP Party on Beach Yellow 1 about 1000. The Party was to report to the Control Officer before landing. AT 0830, however, a message was received from the Division Control Officer, stating that surf conditions would not permit landing boats and suggesting that the Party remain aboard the USS BAYFIELD until conditions improved. (m) AT 0755 RCT 21, in the process of relieving RCT 23, reported that it was held up by enemy fire and requested that BLT 2/24 remain in its present position and be attached to RCT 21 in order to continue the attack at King-hour. The Commanding General did not approve. (n) Preceded by a coordinated artillery and Naval Gunfire preparation from King minus 20 to King-hour, and with 8 VF and 8 VT planes on station at 0730, the Division continued the attack, in accordance with VAC LANFOR Order No. 2-45, at King-hour, 0835. Objective - O-2; boundaries - no change; Line of Departure - front lines at King-hour. (o) RCT 21, with BLT 1/21 on the right, BLT 2/21 on the left, and BLT 3/21 in reserve, was to pass through RCT 23 prior to 0730. Although movement to effect relief was begun at 0500, progress was slow because of heavy mortar and machine gun fire. This RCT was under heavy fire from the first movement towards the line of departure. Defenses to the front were composed of a succession of mutually supporting pillboxes emplaced on the high ground between Airfields No. 1 and No. 2. These pillboxes were equally well protected on the flanks, and only direct hits by major caliber weapons seemed to have any effect on them. Because of the restricted nature of the area, and because of the excellent defensive systems installed, any maneuver, other than a frontal assault, was impossible. As a result, progress during the morning was very slow, but in the afternoon the lines advanced 200 to 400 yards. (p) RCT 25, assisted the advance of RCT 21 by fire, but necessarily had to conform to the movement of RCT 21 on its left. The resistance and defenses in this zone were just as determined as those previously described. On the right RCT 25 advanced approximately 50 to 200 yards. On the left a substantial gain was made during the day but at dark the lines had to be pulled back to the original morning position in order to tie in with RCT 21 on the left. (q) RCT 24, less 2 BLT's, continued in Division Reserve until BLT 2/24 was relieved and reverted to parent control at 1200. BLT 2/24 assembled in TA's 165 E and 166 A. After BLT 2/24 had reverted to RCT control, the RCT, less 1 BLT, was placed in Division Reserve and so disposed as to cover any attempted breakthrough within the Division zone. (r) RCT 23, less the mortar platoons of BLT's 1/23 and 3/23, was assembled in TA's 165 PUQLGH, 164 E, with the CP at 164 Y, as VAC LANFOR Reserve. Mortar platoons supporting the advance of RCT 21 were to be released about 1500. Complete relief of this RCT by RCT 21, however, was not effected until approximately 1130, and it was late afternoon before RCT 23 was entirely disengaged. By the end of the period, the RCT was in the designated assembly area and had made reconnaissance of the zones of action of RCT 25 and the 5th Division. (s) 14th Marines. 1/14 furnished direct support for RCT 25 and 2/14 supported RCT 21. 3/14 was in general support until 1300, when it reinforced the fires of 2/14. 4/14 was in general support. 4/13 was in general support until 1200. At 1229 the Division, upon VAC LANFOR Order, directed the 14th Marines to prepare to move further inland in order to clear beaches to permit general unloading. The movement was initiated at 1425, after the suggested plan of displacement was approved by VAC LANFOR. (t) 4th Tank Battalion. Company "A" and Company "B" (less 1 platoon) continued support of RCT 25. Company "C" (plus 1 platoon) was attached to RCT 21 and closely supported the attack of that Combat Team in the area northeast of Airfield No. 1. This company operated principally against pillboxes and automatic weapons. Within the Battalion, 26 tanks were operational. (u) Aviation. CTF 52.2 continued furnishing support aviation. No land based aircraft were employed, and requests for air missions exceeded the capabilities of the available planes. No Division Tactical Observers were on station. LST 776, equipped with "Brodie Gear", was requested to advise regarding the feasibility of launching and recovering VMO planes. RCT 23 and the 4th Engineer Battalion were also directed to submit recommendations as to whether or not Airfield No. 1 was suitable for the operation of VMO planes. (v) Naval Gunfire. CTF 54, reinforced, continued to support the attack with normal fires. The search for enemy gun positions on the objective was continued throughout the day until the air spot was forced down by lack of visibility. (w) Division Advance CP. At 1139 the Division Advance CP Party started loading into LSM 59, and a message was sent to the Division Tactical Control Officer to have a guide and four (4) LVT(4)'s meet the party on Beach Yellow 1. AT 1500, after reporting to the Control Vessel and transferring the Artillery Officer from that vessel to the LSM, the Advance CP Party landed on Beach Yellow 1. The party contacted the guide and proceeded to TA 164 Y, arriving there at 1600. An Advance Division CP was immediately set up. Because of unfavorable surf and other conditions, it was suggested that the Division Commander wait until the following day to establish the Division CP. The ADC concurred in this recommendation. (x) Because of weather conditions favorable for an enemy counter-attack, RCT 24, at 1617, was ordered to be prepared to relieve RCT 25 on short notice. (y) At 1623 the following dispatch was sent to all units: "Consolidate 1630. Weather ideal for enemy concentration and counter-attack tonight. Prepare strong defense in depth. Maintain contact with adjacent units on flanks." (z) Combat efficiency, reduced by casualties and battle fatigue was estimated to be 65%. (aa) Ad advance of from 100 to 400 yards against determined resistance was made across the Division front. The Division prepared to continue the attack on the following day. (bb) Weather and Visibility. Strong winds from the southeast, rain during the afternoon, moderate swells, and unfavorable surf conditions prevailed during the day.