FROM 1800, 22 FEB 45 TO 1800, 23 FEB 45 (D PLUS 4) (a) AT 2000 the Division Advance CP Party notified the Division that the advance CP had been set up and that communication with all units had been established. AT 0930, 23 February, the 4th Division CP was closed on the USS BAYFIELD and opened at the Advance CP (TA 164 Y) at the same time. (b) At 2000 it was requested that the Division Reconnaissance Company, the 4th Platoon of the Military Police, and the remainder of the Headquarters Company be ordered ashore the following morning for assignment to CP security. The Reconnaissance Company was ordered to land at daylight. (c) At 2140 it was suggested, upon recommendation of the ADC and RCT 23 Commander, that replacements be released to RCT 23 the next day, and to RCT 25 when that unit reverted to Division Reserve. (d) At 0019, in Division Operation Order No. 4-45, RCT 24 was ordered to relieve RCT 25 in its zone prior to 0600. BLT 1/24, previously attached to RCT 25, passed to the control of RCT 24 at 0600. BLT 2/25, in the line, also passed to control of RCT 24 at 0600. The Division Order further directed that RCT 24 attack in the present RCT 25 zone and seize O-2, and assist RCT 21 in the capture of Airfield No. 2. When relieved, RCT 25, less BLT 2/25, was to assemble in the vicinity of TA's 165 EJ and 166 AF as Division Reserve. (e) At 0415 the following message was received from enemy sources: "About 50 enemy troops infiltrated 200 meters northeast of TA 201 QR. Use password SAHURA." Artillery was fired on this position with unknown results. (f) AT 0455 a small counter-attack was repulsed by RCT 25 in TA 183 CD. (g) No Division tactical missions were flown during the night. (h) Night harassing fires by Naval Units were limited because of the depleted supply of ammunition, but few urgent missions were required. (i) Other than the above, and enemy mortar fire falling in the Division Advance CP at 0645, the night was comparatively quiet. (j) At 0725 a dispatch received from VAC LANFOR stated that in order to facilitate the advance of the 5th Division and to assist in the advance of RCT 21, the 5th Division was authorized to move into the 4th Division zone over the boundary as necessary. Close liaison was to be maintained between adjacent Regiments on the boundary. All units concerned were to be kept advised of the plan and actual movements. VAC LANFOR was to be advised if a change in boundaries would facilitate the general advance. (k) Following an intense coordinated artillery and naval gunfire preparation from King minus 45 to King-hour, and a preparation air strike, plan VICTOR, from King plus 15 to King plus 30, the Division continued the attack at King-hour, 0730, in accordance with VAC LANFOR Order No. 3-45 Objective and boundaries - no change; Line of Departure - front lines at King-hour. (l) RCT 21, on the left, was unable to make any advance except on the extreme right because of difficult terrain and extremely stubborn enemy resistance from pillboxes, emplaced tanks, 47mm guns sighted so as to cover both airstrips of Airfield No. 2, high velocity flat trajectory weapons, heavy artillery, mortar and automatic weapons fire. Continuous artillery, naval gunfire and air support failed to break the determined and fanatical resistance in this critical area. (m) RCT 24, on the right, with BLT's 2/24, 3/24, 1/24 in line and 2/25 in reserve, advanced an average of 300 yards along the entire front against moderate to heavy resistance. BLT's 2/24 and 3/24 moved out in time to effect the relief of RCT 25, but because of broken and rugged terrain and enemy fire were not able to completely effect this relief until about 0830. At 0850 all units of this Combat Team, supported by tanks, were moving forward all along the line. (n) RCT 25, less BLT 2/25, when relieved, reverted to Division Reserve in TA's 165 EJ and 166 AF. (o) RCT 23 continued in Corps Reserve. (p) 14th Marines. 3/14 furnished direct support for RCT 24, 2/14 for RCT 21. 1/14 and 4/14 were in general support. 4/13, 5th Division, was attached to the 14th Marines in general support from 0730 until the end of the period. All battalions fired extensive counter-battery, preparation and close support fires. A flash ranging team was established at 1430 on SURIBACHI Volcano and began operations. At 1900 sound ranging was established and located six (6) targets. (q) 4th Tank Battalion. Company "A" and Company "B" (less 1 platoon) were attached to RCT 24. Company "C" (plus 1 platoon) was attached to RCT 21. Neither company was employed to any great extent because of the unusual rough terrain. At the end of the period 27 tanks were operational. (r) Aviation. CTF 52.2 furnished normal support missions. No land-based aircraft were available, and no tactical day missions were flown. VMO-4 did not operate. The Division Radar Station, capable of reporting bogies at ranges exceeding 90 miles, was established. Work was started on the northeast- southwest airstrip of Airfield No. 1 for the use of VMO-4 planes. (s) Naval Gunfire. Elements of CTF 54 continued to support the attack. Normal support missions were fired throughout the day with emphasis remaining on counter-battery fire. (t) Since RCT 21 had been unable to advance during the day, and because RCT 24 was restricted to conform to the movements of RCT 21, and in order to prepare for a concentrated and intensive bombardment, warning orders to consolidate for the night were issued to RCT 24 at 1500, and to RCT 21 at 1630. RCT 21 was in contact with RCT 26 on its left, but a gap of about 200 yards, which was filled by RCT 24 before night, existed on the right. (u) Combat efficiency, reduced by casualties and battle fatigue, was estimated to be 63%. (v) Moderate advance was made on the right of the Division front, but no appreciable gain was made on the left. The Division was prepared to continue the attack on the following day. (w) Weather and Visibility. Winds gusty 15 to 25 MPH from the northwest, overcast most of period, visibility from 4 miles to unlimited, sea and surf moderated during period permitting landing of small boats. (x) At 1605 VAC LANFOR offered the Division the use of 7.2 rockets if they could be unloaded. The Division replied in the affirmative and requested that the landing of launchers and rockets be expedited. (y) At 1639 the Division requested that 4/13 remain attached during the night because of the extended front. VAC LANFOR concurred. 4/13 was available to reinforce the 14th until time for preparation fires on 24 February.