FROM 1800, 23 FEB 45 TO 1800, 24 FEB 45 (D PLUS 5) (a) The enemy attempted small patrol infiltration during the night in front of both RCT's, but only seven enemy were reported to have been able to get through the lines. Sporadic mortar and artillery fire fell in all areas during the hours of darkness. (b) There were no night air observers on station. (c) The 726th SAW Radar functioned efficiently during air raids but sustained damage during the night. (d) Direct support ships, reinforced by gunboat units and VAC LANFOR controlled general support ships, fired harassing and illuminating fires throughout the night. (e) Following a deliberate destructive bombardment by Naval Units with 8" or heavier caliber, from King minus 75 to King minus 15, against targets in areas 199 GHLMJO and 200 FKP, with a maximum VT and VF air strike on TA 199 O and 200 KP from King minus 15 to King-hour, and a coordinated Corps-Division Artillery concentration and preparation from King minus 30 to King-hour, the Division, making the main effort on the left, continued the attack, in accordance with VAC LANFOR Order No. 4-45, at King-hour, 0915, to seize a limited objective, O-1A. Boundary between Divisions - present boundary from front lines to TA 199 V, northwest to TA 216 W, 216 M, Line of Departure - present front lines. (f) RCT 21, with BLT 3/21 on the right, BLT 2/21 on the left, and BLT 1/21 in reserve, and with Companies "A" and "C", 4th Tank Battalion attached but under tactical control of Commanding Officer 5th Tank Battalion, was supposed to coordinate its attack with that of the tanks. The attack, delayed by the late arrival of the tanks, was not initiated until 0930; thus a great deal of the effectiveness of the preparation was lost. During the morning a slow advance closed out the reentrant int he zone of BLT 3/21, and by 1130 the RCT had reached a general line along the southeastern edge of Airfield No. 2. Stiff resistance from the opposite side of the airstrip and from mortar and artillery positions to the north necessitated another preparation and coordinated tank- infantry attack, which was launched at 1330. In bitter action throughout the afternoon, the RCT advanced a considerable distance on the right, with practically no gain on the left, as shown on the map, Progress of Attack. Upon consolidation for the night at 1700, difficulty was experienced in establishing firm contact between the 5th Division on the left and RCT 24 on the right. Gaps existed in the line across the east-west airstrip of Airfield No. 2 but were covered by fire. (g) RCT 24, with BLT 2/25 attached, and with BLT's (from left to right) 2/24, 3/24 and 1/24 in the line, attacked at 0915 on schedule, and, with a steady, slow, and determined advance reached positions as shown on the map, Progress of Attack. In TA 183 CD, which was called "Charlie-Dog Ridge", bloody fighting occurred until this ridge was finally neutralized at 1520. Numerous emplacements in this area and in the draw immediately north were holding up the advance of RCT 21. AT 1700 this RCT was ordered to consolidate for the night. Contact was maintained with RCT 21 on the left, and the shore line on the right. (h) RCT 25, less 2/25, was in Division Reserve in TA 165 EJ and 166 AF. AT 1600 BLT 1/25 was attached to RCT 24 for use as RCT Reserve during the night. (i) RCT 23, continued in VAC LANFOR Reserve. BLT 2/23 was employed to mop up Airfield No. 1 and revetments adjacent thereto, but encountered no enemy. Because of the location of the Division Reserve, the extended front of RCT 24, and the casualties of RCT 21, the Division requested at 1035 that one BLT of VAC LANFOR be released to the 4th Division. AT 1100 VAC LANFOR approved the request but stipulated that the BLT, in view of the contemplated employment of the 3d Division, be moved to the zone of action of RCT 24, and that it was not to be committed without further authority. At 1650 VAC LANFOR released one (1) BLT to Division; at the same time the Division assigned BLT 3/23 to RCT 21 as RCT reserve. RCT 21 assigned BLT 3/23 to an assembly area in TA 182 UP. (j) 14th Marines. 2/14 was in direct support of RCT 21 and 3/14 was in direct support of RCT 24. 1/14 and 4/14 were in general support. 1/14 fires supporting fires for the 5th Tank Battalion. 4/13 reinforced the fires of 2/14 from 1800 23 February to 1200 24 February. (k) 4th Tank Battalion. Companies "A" and "C", after a delayed start, attacked in conjunction with RCT 21 along the NE-SW runway of Airfield No 2, destroying pillboxes, AT guns, and machine gun positions. Company "B", attached to RCT 24, assisted BLT 1/24 in advancing up the shore line. At the end of the period, 26 tanks were operational. (l) Aviation. CTG 52.2 and CTF 94 continued normal air support. Air support and artillery air spot planes were considered insufficient, particularly in the zone of RCT 21. Antiaircraft was very active, and one tactical air observer of 5th Marine Division was shot down. No day air observers were provided as the 5th Division tactical observers were functioning for this Division. No land based aircraft were made available, although planes from the MARIANAS appeared over the objective. VMO-4 did not operate, as personnel were not landed from LST 776. The Division had 8 planes operational during this period. (m) Naval Gunfire. Elements of CTF 54 continued to support the attack by firing normal missions. Major units of CTF 54 fired main batteries on deep support targets from King minus 75 to King minus 15 as part of the coordinated preparation for the attack. Fire support ships worked with VOF planes throughout the day. (n) VAC LANFOR assumed command ashore at 0955 and established its CP at TA 147 R. (o) The 4th Reconnaissance Company landed at 1115. (p) The 3d Marine Division assumed control of the south one-half of Beach Yellow 2 and the north one-half of Red 2 at 1600 and the Division commenced landing at 1315. The Beaches were redesignated as Black Beaches. (q) 4th Engineer Battalion. H & S Company was landed during the afternoon and established the Battalion CP at 165 R at 1500. (r) Support Group. The Commanding Officer, Support Group landed at 1743. The CP was established at TA 164 Y. (s) Combat Efficiency was reduced by casualties and battle fatigue to an estimated 60%. (t) Better progress was made during this period than during the succeeding one. The resistance encountered was determined, but advanced of up to 1000 yards were made by some units. AT the close of the period, the Division prepared to continue the attack the following day. (u) Weather and Visibility. Fair and warmer, wind WNW, 5 to 15 MPH, visibility and ceiling unlimited.