FROM 1800, 24 FEB 45 TO 1800, 25 FEB 45 (D PLUS 6) (a) During the night all units consolidated positions, established contact with adjacent units, and maintained contact with the enemy. Activity during the night was particularly vigorous, especially on the front of RCT 21. Enemy patrols in this area consisted of small parties of about platoon strength which attempted local counter-attacks at 1925 and 2345. Heavy grenade and small arms fire was directed against this RCT during the night. The entire front and rear areas were subjected to mortar, artillery, and rocket fire. RCT 23, which had been in VAC LANFOR Reserve, was released to the Division at 0630. BLT 3/23, attached to RCT 21, was released to RCT 23 at 0530. AT 0700 RCT 21 passed to the control of the 3d Marine Division. (b) There were no night air observers on station. (c) The 726th SAW Radar installation was again operational, tied in with AA Artillery, the 14th Marines, and with the Division Air Section for coordination and the exchange of information. (d) Direct support ships fired harassing and illuminating fires throughout the night. (e) Following a coordinated naval gunfire preparation from King minus 50 to King-hour, with general support ships employing major caliber batteries, and a coordinated VAC LANFOR-Division Artillery preparation from King minus 45 to King-hour, the Division, making its main effort on the left, continued the attack in accordance with VAC LANFOR Order No. 5-45, at King-hour, 0930, to capture O-2. The 4th Division maintained contact with 3d Division. Line of Departure - front lines at King-hour; boundaries - see map, Progress of Attack. (f) RCT 23, with Company "C", 4th Tank Battalion (plus 2 platoons Company "B") attached, on the left executed a passage of lines on the left battalion of RCT 24 during the preparation fire and attacked in column of battalions in the following order; 3/23, 1/23, 2/23. The advance was met with heavy mortar and machine gun fire from pillboxes, bunkers, and caves and progress was slow. In order to expedite the advance, the 3d Division was requested to permit the tanks attached to RCT 21 to use an approach route through the 3d Divisions zone to Airfield No. 2. Permission was granted at 1253, and from this approach the tanks were able to attack pillboxes, bunkers, and AT guns holding up the advance. RCT 23 maintained contact with 3d Division. (g) RCT 24, with BLT 2/25 attached, continued the attack at King-hour and made slow progress throughout the day. The difficult terrain, coupled with mortar fire and with interlocking bands of fire from automatic weapons in pillboxes, bunkers and caves, delayed the advance of this RCT. BLT 2/24 relieved by RCT 23 at King-hour, when reorganized, was placed in RCT reserve until 1600, at which time it relieved BLT 1/24 on the right of the zone of action. BLT 1/25 was released to RCT 25 at 0930. (h) RCT 25, less BLT's 2/25 and 1/15 until 0930 remained in Division Reserve. (i) All units were ordered to consolidate at 1700, and to be prepared to continue the attack at 0800 with no change in boundaries, objectives or attachments. (j) 14th Marines. 2/14 was in direct support of RCT 23, 3/14 in direct support of RCT 24, and 4/14 was in general support. At 0500 VAC LANFOR directed the attachment of one (1) battalion of artillery to support the attack of RCT 9, 3d Division. 1/14 was assigned this mission. Rapid adjustment was made and the battalion ably supported RCT 9 with preparation and close supporting fires for the remainder of the period. At 1726 VAC LANFOR directed that one (1) battalion of the 14th Marines continue to support the 3d Marine Division until 0700, 26 February. All units fired call and counter-battery fire throughout the period. (k) 4th Tank Battalion. The majority of the available tank strength was assigned to RCT 23. The terrain in front of RCT 24 was not negotiable for tanks except along the coast line, where they supported the advance of the right BLT. AT the end of the period, 30 tanks were operational. (l) Aviation. CTG 52.2 and CTF 94 continued normal air support missions. At 1425 a strike by 9 B-24's, each armed with nine (9) 500 pound bombs, was accurately placed as directed in TA 216 NOSTXY. (m) VMO-4 personnel (less pilots and planes) landed and were tentatively located northeast of Airfield No. 1. Enemy AA was active but inaccurate. The North-South airstrip in Airfield No. 1 was considered ready for emergency landings. VMO-4 and two planes were ordered to be flown in from the USS MAKIN ISLAND on 25 February. For the period, the 5th Marine Division tactical observers continued to furnish information to the 4th Division. At 1245 a message was received from EXTROPAC that there would be no more coordinated pre-King-hour air strikes until further notice. (n) Naval Gunfire. Elements of CTF 54 continued to maintain fires in support of the attack. In movements along the east coast, one destroyer was able to take under fire and to destroy major enemy installations. (o) 4th Engineer Battalion. During the period construction was begun on a road in the beach area. AT the end of the period the road was 25% complete. (p) Nine (9) distillation units were ashore, with six (6) units in operation in TA 149 C. The search for and the demolition of land mines, booby traps, and duds was carried out. (q) Combat efficiency was reduced by casualties and battle fatigue to an estimated 55%. (r) The combination of terrain and skillful employment of the best advantage by the enemy, terrain unsuited for tank employment, the locations of installations in areas which were defiladed from our artillery, and the stubborn to-the-death attitude of the defenders and temporarily limited the advance of this Division; but the Division prepared to continue the attack. (s) Weather and Visibility. Fair and Warmer, visibility and ceiling unlimited, 2/10 to 4/10 high cloud cover.