10. FROM 1800, 27 FEB 45 TO 1800, 28 FEB 45 (D PLUS 9) (a) Activity during the night consisted of heavy mortar fire falling along the Division front and in CP locations. Fifteen (15) heavy shells hit the Division CP area before 2200. Fire of either 20mm of 40mm enemy automatic weapons fell in the beach area. AT 0043 RCT 23 reported parachutes dropping in enemy-held territory about 400 to 600 yards in front of the Division's zone. Although reported from three sources, the plane (or planes) were not picked up on the radar. (b) CTF 54 continued to provide normal harassing and illumination fires during the night. (c) After a coordinated VAC LANFOR-4th Division-3d Division-Naval Gunfire preparation from King minus 45 to King-hour, the Division continued the attack at King-hour, 0815, in accordance with VAC LANFOR Order No. 8-45, to capture O-2, prepared to continue the attack on order. Formation - no change; Boundaries and Objectives - see map, Progress of Attack. Line of Departure - front lines at King-hour. (d) RCT 23, (plus one (1) company from RCT 24) with BLT's 1/23 on the left, and 2/23 on the right, and 3/23 in reserve, continued the attack at King- hour. BLT 2/23 relieved BLT 3/23 prior to King-hour. Initial advances on the left moved favorably for about 300 yards; however, increasing artillery fire, mortar fire, and cross fire from machine guns in bunkers and pillboxes halted the advance on the right. ON the left resistance from heavy weapons of all types directed from the vicinity of Hill 382 temporarily held up the advance. AT 1300 a coordinated attack, following a shore preparation, permitted the extreme left of BLT 2/23 to advance approximately 300 yards. The operation of Company "B", 4th Tank Battalion, was restricted because of the terrain and the heavy AT fire which could not be located. RCT 23 maintained contact with 3d Marine Division. (e) RCT 25, with BLT's 1/25, 2/25, 3/25 in line, and 3/24 in reserve, continued the attack at King-hour. The center of this RCT was unable to advance during the period, but a gain of 250 yards was made on the fight flank. Upon request of RCT 25, one 75mm pack howitzer was assigned to BLT 2/25 as an accompanying gun in order to neutralize opposition to the front. The howitzer was transported to the rear of the front lines via DUKW; from there it was packed to the vicinity of BLT 2/25, where it was assembled and dug in preparatory to firing. It succeeded in destroying the opposition to the front of the BLT. The howitzer returned to parent control at 2100. Company "B", 2d Armored Amphibian Tractor Battalion was attached for the period. (f) On the Regimental boundary, approximately in TA 201 U, the flanks of both RCT's received a murderous concentration of heavy mortar fire which was extremely accurate and which must have been observed fire. Although all agencies of the Division were employed in an attempt to locate the source of this fire, no definite conclusion regarding its location could be reached. (g) RCT 24, less BLT 3/24 and one (1) company, remained in Division Reserve. (h) 14th Marines. There was no change since the last period. (i) 4th Tank Battalion. There was no change since the last period. A new battalion CP was set up in TA 165 O. Thirty-five (35) tanks were operational; twelve (12) destroyed, and nine (9) damaged. (j) Aviation. CTG 52.2 continued to provide air support. The B-24 mission was cancelled for the afternoon strike. VAC LANFOR Air Delivery Section planes from SAIPAN dropped ammunition and medical supplies. VMO-4 had five (5) planes on Airfield No. 1, and two (2) on LST 776. VMO-4 furnished air spot for ten (10) artillery missions, conducted thirty-five (35) fire missions and flew tactical observers. Two (2) VOF air spot planes were maintained on station during the day. The Air Liaison Officer with RCT 25 reported that less than 50% of the Napalm dropped in the morning strike detonated. The strike requested by RCT 23 was delayed and was not dropped in the TA requested. (k) Naval Gunfire. Elements of CTF 54 continued to support the attack. Naval gunfire support was on call throughout the day. In the afternoon one (1) destroyer closed on the east coast and successfully engaged enemy guns in direct fire up draws and ravines which opened seaward. (l) Combat efficiency on the Division was increased to an estimated 60% by the assignment of replacements to the RCT's. (m) Weather and Visibility. Weather was fair, visibility good with ceiling overcast 6/10 to 9/10. (n) All units were ordered to consolidate for the night at 1700, and to be prepared to continue the attack at King-hour, 0830, March 1st. (o) At 1715 VAC LANFOR directed that one (1) battalion of this Division be assigned to VAC LANFOR Reserve by 1200, 1 March, 1945 and that it be assembled in 4th Division zone south of grid 73.