11. FROM 1800, 28 FEB TO 1800, 1 MAR 45 (D PLUS 10) (a) At 1930 RCT 24 was alerted to relieve RCT 23 prior to King-hour. (b) At 2230 RCT 25 reported observing and firing on an estimated 150 enemy forming up in front of BLT 3/25. Naval Gunfire and artillery were requested and succeeded in dispersing the concentration. Sporadic mortar and artillery fire fell in the Division area during the night. (c) After a coordinated VAC LANFOR-Naval Gunfire preparation from King minus 45 to King-hour, and an intense Division artillery preparation beginning at King minus 10 and moving forward in successive concentrations after King- hour, the Division continued the attack at King-hour, 0830, in accordance with VAC LANFOR Order NO. 9-45, to capture O-2, prepared to continue the attack to O-3 on order. Boundaries - no change; Line of Departure - front lines at King- hour. (d) RCT 23, when ordered to consolidate for the night at 281700, was not in contact with the unit on its left. Two (2) platoons from the Reserve Battalion were sent into the zone of the 3d Marine Division to close the gap and establish contact. To accomplish this it was necessary for these platoons to fight their way through by-passed enemy defenses in the 3d Division zone. During the night these platoons suffered casualties from enemy positions located to their rear. When RCT 23 was relieved by RCT 24, BLT 3/23 was then attached to RCT 24 until BLT 3/24, which was attached to RCT 25, could be relieved by BLT 3/23. When this relief was effected at 0930, BLT 3/23 was then attached to and became the reserve of RCT 25. At 1200 BLT 2/23 assembled in TA 165 BC as VAC LANFOR Reserve. RCT 23, less BLT's 2/23 and 3/23, assembled in TA 182 YRS as Division Reserve. (e) RCT 24 relieved RCT 23 in line at 0630. The relief was initiated at 0330 and was accomplished by placing BLT 2/24 in line with BLT 1/23 and BLT 1/24 with 2/23. The relief was completed at 0530. The company attached to RCT 23 reverted to RCT 24 control at 0630. The fighting around the base of Hill 382 was intense and continuous until consolidation for the night was ordered at 1700. Slight gains were made on the left and right of the RCT zone. Upon consolidation at 1700 firm contact with RCT 25 on the right was established. after 1400 RCT 21, on the left, was able to advance along the Division boundary. BLT 3/24 was ordered into the zone of RCT 21 to fill the gap. Although the ground was over which this BLT moved into position had been crossed by RCT 21, it was necessary for the companies of BLT 3/24 to fight their way over this same are to take up a position on the Division boundary in order to establish contact with units on its right and left. By 1800 consolidation had been effected and firm contact had been established. The RCT CP moved to TA 182 S at 0930. (f) RCT 25, with BLT's 1/25, 2/25, and 3/25 in line from left to right, continued to attack at King-hour but limited its advance in order to conform to the movement of RCT 24 on its left. BLT 1/25, assisted by one (1) company of the RCT reserve (BLT 3/23), spent the remainder of the period in an attempt to reduce the reentrant and pocket of resistance in TA 183 J. At 0800 the Division Reconnaissance Company was directed to report to RCT 25 to assist in mopping up operations in he rear areas of the RCT. It was further directed that the Reconnaissance Company was not to be committed in the frontlines and that it would be released not later than 1700. The RCT CP was shelled at 1605 and all agencies were employed to search for probable source of fire. Contact was established with RCT 24 when that unit was ordered to consolidate at 1700. Company "B", 2d Armored Amphibian Tractor Battalion, was attached for the period. (g) 14th Marines. 1/14 was in direct support of RCT 25, 3/14 was in direct support of RCT 24, 2/14 reinforced 3/14, and 4/14 was in general support. VAC LANFOR artillery reinforced the 14th Marines on call. VMO-4 fired a total of thirty-three (33) fire missions. Three (3) guns were spotted by air observation and destroyed by VAC LANFOR artillery fire. Sound ranging picked up fifteen (15) enemy guns, which were immediately shelled. (h) 4th Tank Battalion. Company "A" remained attached to RCT 25; Company "B" was attached to RCT 24; Company "C" was under Battalion Control. (i) Aviation. Air support was furnished by CTG 52.2. VMO-4 flew two (2) photographic and five (5) day observation missions. One (1) experimental night mission was flown and proved to be very successful. Two (2) OY-1's arrived on the field from LST 776; VMO-4 then had seven (7) planes based on Airfield No. 1. One (1) FM-2, the first carrier-based plane to land on Airfield No. 1, made an emergency landing during the morning hours. (j) Naval Gunfire. Preparation fires in TA's 185 BCG, 201 HIMNRS, 202 CHLMPQVX and 219 UV by direct support ships were controlled by individual battalions. Gunboats controlled by BLT 3/25, fired 40mm in TA's 168 A, 185 V. Between King-hour and King-hour plus 70 two (2) CA's and one (1) BB fired in TA 202 NO. Following this preparation, one (1) CA and one (1) DD closed on the coast, taking observed installations under direct fire. These ships reported three (3) guns destroyed in TA 219 A and a direct hit in a cave at TA 203 U. Four (4) DD's and two (2) gunboats were employed by the Division throughout the day. (k) 4th Engineer Battalion. Company "A" was attached to RCT 25. Headquarters Platoon continued construction of the supply road paralleling the coast. (l) Combat efficiency was estimated to be 55%. (m) Weather and Visibility. Weather was fair, visibility was god, with ceiling overcast average 3/10.