12.  FROM 1800, 1 MAR 45 TO 1800, 2 MAR 45 (D PLUS 11)

	(a)	The period of darkness passed with little incident other than the 
normal infiltration attempts by the enemy in small numbers.  Sporadic mortar and 
artillery fire was laid down by the enemy during the night, but at each salve 
either VAC or Division Artillery immediately commenced counter-battery fire.

	(b)	Direct support ships fired illumination fires during the night.

	(c)	Following VAC LANFOR Artillery preparation from King-hour minus 
30 to King-hour minus 15 and King-hour minus 10 to King-hour, and an intense 
Division preparation beginning at King-hour minus 10 and moving forward in 
successive concentrations after King-hour, the Division continued the attack at 
0800, in accordance with VAC LANFOR Order No. 10-45, to capture O-2, 
prepared to continue the attack to O-3 on order.  Boundaries - no change; Line 
of Departure - front lines at King-hour.

	(d)	RCT 24, with BLT's 3/24, 2/24, and 1/24 abreast from left to right, 
continued the attack at King-hour and made slight advances on the right and 
left and proceeded with the mopping up of pillboxes and caves on the reverse 
slope of Hill 382.  It appeared that there were underground passageways 
leading into the defenses on Hill 382, and when one occupant of a pillbox was 
killed another one came up to take his place.  This mopping-up proved to be a 
lengthy process.  This RCT maintained contact with the 3d Division on the left, 
and upon consolidation at 1700 also established firm contact with the units on 
the right.

	(e)	RCT 25, with BLT 3/23 attached, and with BLT's 1/25, 2/25, and 3/25 
in line from left to right, continued the attack at King-hour, and made its main 
effort on the left flank.  In extremely biter fighting against the reentrant of the left, 
BLT 1/23 and other elements spent the day in reducing pillboxes and caves 
which lined the face of the cliff in TA 184 B.  Flame thrower and combat tanks 
were employed against one concrete blockhouse at the top of the cliff.  
Although, it was reasonable to assume that it too was connected by a 
subterranean passage and that it would be reoccupied.  The BLT's in the center 
and on the right maintained their positions during the day.  Upon consolidation 
for the night contact was maintained with RCT 24.

	(f)	RCT 23, less BLT's 2/23 and 3/23, remained in Division Reserve.  BLT 
2/23 was in VAC LANFOR Reserve and BLT 3/23 was attached to RCT 25.  The 
Division Reserve was employed in mopping up the rear area and re-equipping in 
preparation for further action.

	(g)	14th Marines.  There was no change in the assignments of this unit.  
Air observers fires a total of forty-two (42) missions.  Sound ranging located six (6) 
enemy guns firing in the zone of the Division and adjusted fire on them.  A total of 
306 missions were fired.

	(h)	4th Tank Battalion.  No change in assignments.

	(i)	Aviation.  Air support was furnished by CTG 52.2.  VMO-4 flew four 
(4) day and one (1) photographic, and one (1) night observation missions.  Two 
(2) planes were damaged on the field by enemy artillery fire and one (1) in flight 
by AA fire.  Planes dropped propaganda leaflets over the Division zone of 
action.  At the end of the period five (5) planes were operational.

	(j)	Naval Gunfire.  Elements of CTF 54 continued to support the attack.  
Because of the extreme irregularity of the front lines, direct support ships did not 
fire harassing fire during the night.  During the day two (2) BB's and one (1) CA 
fired general support missions in eastern sectors of TA's 185, 202, 219 and all of 
236, and mortar units covered TA's 250 and 251.  RCT 24's ships were unable to 
fire a preparation for the King-hour attack because of safety limits; RCT 25's ships 
fired in TA 185 BCGHI.  Four (4) DD's and two (2) gunboats were assigned to the 
Division for the day.

	(k)	4th Engineer Battalion.  Company "A" was attached to RCT 25; 
Company "B" was attached to RCT 24, and Company "C" to RCT 23, in Division 
Reserve.

	(l)	Combat Efficiency was reduced by excessive casualties, 
particularly to key personnel, and battle fatigue to an estimated 50%.

	(m)	Weather and Visibility.  Weather was fair, visibility good, with ceiling 
overcast 3/10 to 5/10.