15.  FROM 1800, 4 MAR 45 TO 1800, 5 MAR 45  (D PLUS 14)

	(a)	During the night the zone of the Division was fairly quiet except in 
the area of RCT 24, where heavy mortar and artillery fire was received constantly 
during the hours of darkness.  The resulting casualties were moderate.

	(b)	The Division acted in accordance with VAC LANFOR dispatch 
041624, which stated that except for limited adjustment of positions the plan was 
to reorganize preparatory to attacking on the limited front on 6 March, and that 
the Division would effect necessary reorganization by noon 5 March to have one 
(1) RCT, less one (1) battalion, available for employment on 6 March, exclusive of 
Regimental Reserve, by units in the line.  The general direction of the proposed 
attack was to be eastward in the present zone of action.

	(c)	RCT 24, on the left, remained in position and, by thinning out the 
front lines, effected the necessary reorganization to establish a strong 
Regimental Reserve line of three (3) companies.  Mopping up of the rear areas 
was continued during the period.

	(d)	RCT 25, on the right, with the Division Reconnaissance Company 
attached as of 0700, 5 March, relieved RCT 23 in its zone at 0600 5 March. This 
RCT also effected the necessary reorganization to establish a Regimental 
Reserve of one (1) company, and continued mopping up the rear areas.  A 
Provisional Battalion composed of the Division Reconnaissance Company and 
Company "L", BLT 3/25, was organized and relieved BLT 3/23 in TA's 183 IO and 
184 K.

	(e)	RCT 23, less BLT 2/23, assembled in Division Reserve in the vicinity of 
TA's 182 O and 183 KL.  The remainder of the period was devoted to reorganizing, 
reequipping, and rehabilitating in preparation for the attack on 6 March.  BLT 
2/23 was in VAC LANFOR Reserve until 1500, at which time it was relieved by BLT 
1/23.

	(f)	The 14th Marines continued to fire on targets of opportunity and 
executed harassing fires throughout the period.  1/14 was in direct support of RCT 
25, 2/14 direct support of RCT 23, 3/14 in direct support of RCT 24, and 4/14 in 
general support.  Air observation fired a total of seventeen (17) missions during 
the period.  One (1) target was reported by sound ranging, and VAC LANFOR 
Artillery was adjusted on the target.  The total number of missions fired was 302.

	(g)	4th Tank Battalion.  Company "C" was attached to RCT 23, 
Company "B" to RCT 24, and Company "A" to RCT 25.  AT the end of the period 
30 tanks were operational.  Company "A" tanks were employed extensively in 
TA's 183 JO and 184 FK.

	(h)	Aviation.  CTG 52.2 continued to support the attack.  Units of the 
Division requested fire missions, of which four (4) were completed in TA's 185 KGD 
and 202 DEGLQ.  VMO-4 flew ten (10) tactical observation missions; one (1) pilot 
was wounded and evacuated, and four (4) planes were operational at the end 
of the period.

	(i)	Naval Gunfire.  Elements of CTF 54 fired call fire missions throughout 
the day.  Two (2) DD's, one (1) CA and, one (1) LCS were employed by the 
division.

	(j)	2d Armored Amphibian Tractor Battalion.  Company "B" was 
attached to RCT 25.  This company patrolled the beach areas north of the 
location of BLT 3/25 and fired on targets along beach.

	(k)	4th Engineer Battalion.  Company "A", attached to RCT 25, 
continued road work in the RCT rear area.  The 2d and 3d platoons, attached to 
BLT's 2/25 and 3/25 respectively, took up defensive positions and supervised the 
laying of anti-personnel min field in front of these positions.  Company "A", 
attached to RCT 24, was inactive during the day.  Company "C", attached to 
RCT 23, was the rest area with that RCT.

	(l)	Combat Efficiency was estimated to be 45%.  The reorganization 
directed by VAC LANFOR was completed by 1200 and the Division was 
prepared to continue the attack on 6 March.

	(m)	Weather and Visibility.  Occasional showers during the night.  
Daylight period was fair with visibility good, ceiling overcast 2/10 and 5/10.