16. FROM 1800, 5 MAR 45 TO 1800, 6 MAR 45 (D PLUS 15) (a) The night was relatively quiet except for mortar and small arms fire along the front of RCT 24 and an attempted infiltration in this area. (b) One (1) LCS fired harassing fires along the coast in TA 185 throughout the night. Illumination was provided by elements of CTF 54. (c) Following a coordinated artillery preparation by twelve (12) artillery battalions (three (3) from the 3d Marine Division, three (3) from the 5th Marine Division, four (4) from the 4th Marine Division, and two (2) VAC LANFOR) reinforced by Naval Gunfire, from King-hour plus 45 to King-hour plus 81, the Division continued the attack at King-hour plus 60, King-hour being 0800, in accordance with VAC LANFOR Order No. 13-45, to capture the high ground in the left of the zone of action and that portion of O-3 within zone. For boundaries, zone of action, line of departure, and objectives, see map -Progress of Attack. (d) RCT 23, less BLT 1/23, moved into positions prior to 0600, relieved BLT 3/24 in its zone with BLT 2/23 and attacked in column of battalions at King-hour plus 60, to seize the high ground in its zone. See the map, Progress of Attack. In extremely bitter fighting against caves, pillboxes, and emplacements in rugged terrain, this RCT advanced approximately 100 yards except on the extreme left where no gain was made. Upon consolidation for the night at 1700, a gap existed between the left and the 3d Division, but firm contact was made and maintained by RCT 23 before dark. At 0700 BLT 1/23 moved into TA 182 VW as VAC LANFOR Reserve. (e) RCT 24, less BLT 3/24, and with BLT 2/24 on the left and BLT 1/24 on the right, attacked at King-hour plus 60 in conjunction with RCT 23. Against opposition similar to that of RCT 23, RCT 24 moved forward to conform to the advance of RCT 23. Upon consolidation for the night at 1700, contact with RCT 23 was made and maintained. BLT 3/24 reverted to Division Reserve at 0630 in TA's 182 O and 183 KL when it was relieved by BLT 2/23. See the map - Progress of Attack. (f) RCT 25, on the right, with the Divisions Reconnaissance Company attached and with BLT's 1/25, 2/15, and 3/25 in line from left to right, held in position on the right and center and assisted the attack of RCT's 23 and 24 by fire, prepared to conform to the advance of RCT 24. This RCT employed the Division Reconnaissance Company and elements of the Combat Team to mop up in TA 184 FK. RCT consolidated for the night and maintained contact with RCT 24. (g) 14th Marines. All battalions fired a coordinated preparation for VAC LANFOR from King-hour minus 10 to King-hour plus 21 in the zones of the 3d and 5th Divisions and from King-hour plus 45 to King-hour plus 81 in the 4th Division zone. VAC LANFOR Artillery reinforced fires on call. 1/14 was in direct support of RCT 25, 2/14 with RCT 23, 3/14 with RCT 24, and 4/14 was in general support. Air observation fired a total of twenty (20) fire missions during the period. Sound ranging reported and adjusted fire on two (2) missions. The total number of missions fired was 472. (h) 4th Tank Battalion. Four (4) tanks were employed in the zone of RCT 23 and a flame thrower tank assisted in the mopping up operations in the rear areas of RCT 25. At the end of the period thirty-five (35) tanks were operational, eleven (11) were destroyed, and eight (8) were damaged. (i) Aviation. CTG 52.2 continued to furnish air support. Three (3) missions were requested by the Division in TA 185 and all were executed. VMO-4 flew one (1) night and seven (7) day observation missions. Five (5) planes were operational at the end of the period. Enemy AA was active throughout the day. (j) Naval Gunfire. Three (3) DD's, one (1) CA, and one (1) LCS provided naval gunfire support for the attack. Preparation fires were fired from King-hour minus 10 to King-hour plus 45 at a reduced rate, and from King-hour plus 45 to King-hour plus 81, with fires increased. One (1) Naval Gunfire Spotter was placed aboard a DD and controlled direct fires against located targets along the east coast. (k) 4th Engineer Battalion had no change in its assignment. (l) Combat Efficiency, reduced by excessive casualties among experienced leaders, was estimated to be 45%. (m) Weather and Visibility. The weather was fair and visibility was good. There was a slight haze with coiling overcast 2/10 to 4/10.