17.  FROM 1800, 6 MAR 45 TO 1800, 7 MAR 45  (D PLUS 16)

	(a)	Activity during the night was sporadic but costly.  AT 2130 several 
enemy mortar shells fell in the lines of BLT 2/23, wounding approximately thirty 
(30) men.  AT 2210 enemy were reported moving in front of BLT 3/25; artillery fire 
was requested and the formation or gathering was dispersed.  AT 2250 BLT 1/24 
reported that up to that time it had a quietest night on the line.  During the night 
forty (40) to fifty (50) of the enemy came into the foxholes occupied by elements 
of BLT 1/25 and in the ensuing melee one (1) officer, twelve (12) enlisted Marines, 
and an estimated fifty (50) Japanese were killed.  At 0515 a rocket fell into the 
CP of BLT 2/23 killing one (1) and wounding five (5) men.  The BLT commander 
was badly shaken up and was relieved by the Executive Officer of RCT 23.  This 
interruption necessitated a thirty (30) minute delay in meeting King-hour.  The 
Division rear areas were quiet.  Illumination only was fired during the night.

	(b)	The Division continued the attack at King-hour plus 30, King-hour 
being 0730, in accordance with VAC LANFOR Order No. 14-45, without a 
preliminary artillery or naval gunfire preparation, to complete missions assigned 
on the previous day.  Formation and boundaries - no change; line of departure - 
front lines at King-hour.

	(c)	RCT 23, less BLT 1/23, making the main effort for the Division, 
attacked within its zone, advancing slowly during the morning.  At 1230, following 
a five (5) minute preparation, the attack was continued and resulted in 
substantial gains, particularly on the extreme left.  BLT 1/23 continued in VAC 
LANFOR Reserve.  Upon consolidation for the night at 1700, contact was 
established and maintained with the 3d Division.

	(d)	RCT 24, less BLT 3/24, in the center, with 2/24 and 1/24 in line left to 
right, continued the attack against heavy opposition, particularly on the right 
where intense machine gun and mortar fire stopped all advance. At 1245, 
following a five (5) minute preparation, the attack was continued.  AT 1700, 
when consolidation was ordered, this RCT had advanced on the left to positions; 
shown on the map -Progress of Attack and had made firm contact with RCT 23.  
During the morning when Company "C" was relieved Company "B", a heavy 
mortar shell landed in the CP, killing the Company Commander and six (6) men 
of company "C".  BLT 3/24 continued in Division Reserve.	

	(e)	RCT 25, plus the Division Reconnaissance Company, with BLT's 1/25, 
2/25, and 3/25 in line from left to right, maintained contact with BLT 1/24 but was 
unable to advance because of teh murderous fire coming from the front of BLT 
1/24; as a result of this fire no gains were made by the RCT during the period.  
Mopping up operations in the rear areas continued.

	(f)	14th Marines.  From 0800 to 0830 the Regiment fired neutralization 
fires on all known enemy mortar and artillery positions.  at 1225 VAC LANFOR and 
the 14th Marines fired a five (5) minute coordinated preparation on the front of 
RCT 23; at 1240 the same preparation was fired for RCT 24.  There was no 
changes in the assignment of support battalions. Air observation fired a total of 
sixteen (16) missions, VAC LANFOR artillery being fired when targets required 
heavy artillery.  Sound ranging adjusted three (3) VAC LANFOR artillery missions.  
The total number of missions fired was 159.

	(g)	4th Tank Battalion. There were no changes in assignments.  Tanks 
assisted and supported the attack of RCT 23, especially in the center of the RCT 
zone; however, the terrain prevented the operation of the tanks except in 
restricted localities.  RCT 25 continued to operate flame thrower and other tanks 
against concrete blockhouses and caves in the vicinity of TA 184 FK.  At the end 
of the period thirty-four (34) tanks were operational, eight (8) damaged, and 
twelve (12) were destroyed.

	(h)	Aviation.  CTG 52.2 continued to furnish air support.  Five (5) missions 
were requested by the Division; three (3) were completed and two (2) were 
cancelled. All air support was cancelled at 1510 because of bad weather.  
VMO-4 flew one (1) weather and five (5) tactical observation missions.  AT the 
end of the period five (5) planes were operational.

	(i)	Naval Gunfire.  The Division was supported by four (4) DD's and one 
(1) LCS.  A concentration was fired on known targets from King-hour to King plus 
30.  All units were available for call fired during the day.  Two (2) VOF spot planes 
were employed with the fire support ships; one (1) DD working with air spot 
reported eight (8) artillery or mortar positions were destroyed in TA 185 KL and six 
(6) guns were knocked out in TA's 185 A and 202 U.  A naval gunfire spotter 
aboard a DD spotted fires along the coast.

	(j)	4th Engineer Battalion.  There were no changes in assignments.  All 
units supported their respective RCT's by executing demolitions work, mine 
removal, and road repair.

	(k)	Combat Efficiency was reduced to an estimated 45%.

	(l)	Weather and Visibility.  The weather was warm, but visibility was 
poor.  There were occasional showers with overcast ceiling limited at times to 300 
feet.