18.  FROM 1800, 7 MAR 45 TO 18000, 8 MAR 45  (D PLUS 17)

	(a)	Activity along the front lines for the night consisted mainly of small 
and large mortar fire and small arms fire.  Generally the night was quiet, 
compared to previous nights.  Some enemy mortar shells fell in the lines of BLT 
1/24 and on the front of RCT 25.  At 0300 BLT 3/24 was released to RCT 24, 
relieving BLT 2/24 in the line at 0530. RCT 24 reported that the enemy attempted 
a withdrawal during the night and that a considerable number of them were 
killed.  BLT 2/24 reverted to Division Reserve in TA's 182 O and 183 KL.  Only 
illumination fires were fired during the night.

	(b)	Following a coordinated preparation in successive concentrations 
reinforced by VAC LANFOR Artillery and naval gunfire from King-hour minus 90 to 
King-hour minus 60, the Division resumed the attack at King-hour minus 90, King-
hour being 0750, making the main effort in the center, in accordance with VAC 
LANFOR Order No. 15-45, to assist in the capture of the remainder of the island.  
Formation and boundaries - no change; Line of Departure - front lines at King-
hour.

	(c)	RCT 23, less BLT 1/23, on the right, attacking in column of battalions, 
BLT 2/23 in the line, jumped off on time. Advancing initially against light 
resistance, which soon stiffened to normal, considerable gain was made in the 
center of the zone.  The enemy was apparently confused by the early morning 
attack.  Resistance by the enemy in this area was relatively less than that 
experienced o the remainder of the front.  When this RCT consolidated for the 
night at 1640, contact was established on the right and left.  BLT 1/23 continued 
in VAC LANFOR Reserve.

	(d)	RCT 24, less BLT 2/24, in the center, with BLT's 3/24 on the left and 
1/24 on the right, continued the attack at King-hour minus 90.  Making its main 
effort on the left, this RCT was able to make only slight gains, generally in the 
center, against an enemy who was concealed in perfectly fortified positions.  
Resistance was characterized by extremely heavy small arms, knee mortar, and 
large mortar fire.  The right of this RCT was unable to even by-pass the resistance 
holding up its advance.  AT 1120 BLT 2/24 was directed to reconnoiter the area 
of BLT 3/25 with the probability of relieving that BLT that night.  Upon 
consolidation at 1640 contact was made with RCT 23 and maintained with RCT 
25.  BLT 2/24 continued in Division Reserve.

	(e)	RCT 25, on the right, with BLT's /25, 2/25, and 3/25 in line from left to 
right, held its position and maintained contact with RCT 24 on its left.  Elements of 
the RCT and the Division Reconnaissance Company continued mopping up 
operations in the rear areas and in the vicinity of TA 184 KL.

	(f)	14th Marines.  Other than the preparation fires for the attack, fires 
were executed on call from the RCT's.  Eighteen (18) rounds of yellow smoke 
were fired to pin-point targets for support aircraft.  There were no changes in 
assignments.  VAC LANFOR Artillery reinforced fires on call.  Air observation fired 
a total of nine (9) missions.  No targets were reported by sound ranging during 
the period.  The total number of missions fired was 303.

	(g)	4th Tank Battalion.  Tanks were able to render some support to the 
attack of RCT 23, even though their approach was restricted more or less to 
roads.  A mine field was encountered in TA 201 NOT and three (3) tanks were 
destroyed.  Further tank activity in this area was delayed until the minefield was 
cleared by the engineers.  During a requested air strike in TA 185 KL, an auxiliary 
gas tank of napalm, through error, was dropped in TA 201 N and fell directly to 
the rear of a friendly tank.  The Napalm was splashed all over the tank.  The outer 
surfaces of the tank caught fire but the crew successfully evacuated the tank 
and with a portable CO2 extinguisher put out the fire.  The crew sustained no 
casualties and the tank was not put out of action.  At the end of the period, 
thirty-two (32) tanks were operational.

	(h)	Aviation.  CTF 52.2 continued to furnish air support.  The Division 
requested two (2) strikes, one (1) of which was completed in TA 185 KL and the 
other of which was cancelled by the originator.  The 7th Fighter Command, with 
eight (8) P-51's strafed the coastal area in the Division zone.  VMO-4 flew seven 
(7) tactical observation missions and five (5) planes were operational at the end 
of the period.  The 726th SAW Squadron reverted to VAC LANFOR control.

	(i)	Naval Gunfire.  Four (4) DD's from CTF 54 supported the attack.  Call 
fires for the period were executed in TA's 185 and 202.  A large amount of 40mm 
ammunition was employed in lieu of the 5" as a safety precaution.  One (1) naval 
gunfire spotter aboard a DD adjusted fires along the coastal areas.

	(j)	4th Engineer Battalion.  There was no changes in assignments.  This 
battalion continued to support the RCT's by executing demolitions of pillboxes, 
blockhouses, and the entrances and exits to caves and by mine removal and 
road work in the forward and rear areas.

	(k)	Combat Efficiency.  The combat efficiency had been reduced by 
excessive casualties, particularly to key personnel, and battle fatigue, to an 
estimated 45%.

	(l)	Weather and Visibility.  The weather was cloudy and cold, visibility 
was fair, and ceiling was overcast 10/10.