19. FROM 1800, 8 MARCH 45 TO 1800, 9 MAR 45 (D PLUS 18) (a) By 1800 enemy fires, consisting of rockets, mortars, grenades, rifle, and machine fire, were increasing in intensity, building up to a peak about 2000. Casualties were suffered in units all along the Division front and particularly in the area of TA 184 ABFG. Enemy movements indicated that either a counter-attack or a large scale infiltration would be attempted. Enemy units infiltrated in the zones of all RCT's but were most successful in the zone of RCT 23 where some elements reached the CP of BLT 2/23. AT 1920 ten (10) to fifteen (15) Japanese were observed on a ridge in TA 202 QR. Artillery fire was requested on this area, and the enemy were either killed or dispersed. At 2300 there was considerable enemy activity along the front of BLT 3/24 and extending to the left in the zone of BLT 2/23 where infiltration attempts were reported. AT 2330 the enemy attacked BLT 2/23 in force, and some elements succeeded in penetrating as far as the BLT CP where they were either killed or dispersed. It was apparent that this skirmish was not an all out "Banzai" attack but a well-planned and predetermined counter--attack in force. Captured information revealed that an assembly area had been designated at the crossroads in TA 201 N, from which the enemy moved up to CR 331 and south along the road to the CP of BLT 2/23, and that the forward elements were to be followed by a much larger force. The attack failed because of intense artillery fire and the disruption of the Japanese communications. A total of over 300 of the enemy were killed in the zone of BLT 2/23 during this counterattack. (b) Throughout the night there was constant pressure along the front of RCT 24; numerous small units attempted to infiltrate, but all were repulsed and enemy dead in this zone totaled 150 for the night. Some infiltration was attempted through RCT 25 but no enemy were successful. Illumination fires were employed throughout the night. Contact throughout the night was maintained with a support ship of the 3d Marine Division which fired on possible rocket positions in TA's 185 and 202 and kept the east coast under observation. AT 0415 Flash Red was reported; at 0505 Flash Blue, control Green, was received, and at 0512 Flash White was reported. (c) Following a coordinated VAC LANFOR-Division Artillery preparation from King-hour to King-hour plus 10, with a limitation on ammunition expenditure to 1000 rounds 75mm, and 1000 rounds 105mm, the Division continued the attack at King-hour, 0700, in accordance with VAC LANFOR Order No. 16-45, to complete the mission assigned in the previous Operation Order. Formation and boundaries - no change; Line of Departure - front lines at King-hour. (d) RCT 23, less BLT 1/23, resumed the attack in a column of battalions with BLT 2/23 in the assault. Considerable advance was made on the right and the right center against fairly light opposition, but the entire left was held up by intense enemy fire from the ridge in TA 202 BG. BLT 1/23 was released to RCT 23 at 1500, and BLT 3/23 reverted to VAC LANFOR Reserve at 1700 in TA 165 BC. Although ordered to consolidate at 1700, this RCT continued the attack to improve; its positions and did not halt the attack until 1730. RCT 23 maintained contact with the 3d Marine Division on the left and with RCT 24 on the right. (e) RCT 24, less BLT 2/24, began the attack at King-hour with the main effort o the left in order to overrun a center of resistance along the boundary. This attack was not successful, and after a rapid reorganization the RCT launched a second attack at 0900, resulting in a breakthrough for a gain of about 300 yards on the left and left center. BLT 1/24, having suffered numerous casualties began a reorganization of its units in a consolidated BLT of two (2) companies under the command of the RCT Executive Officer. The BLT Commander was relieved just prior to this reorganization. By 1200 BLT 1/24 was able to advance its line on the left to a position opposite BLT 3/24. Extremely heavy resistance on the right held up the advance and little gain was made in that sector. Upon consolidation for the night at 1700, this RCT was in contact with elements on its right and left. BLT 2/24 was released to RCT 25 at 0500 to relieve BLT 3/25 on the extreme right of the Division zone. When released, BLT 3/25 was directed to assemble in TA's 182 O and 183 KL as Division Reserve. BLT 3/25 closed in the assembly area at 0730. (f) RCT 25, less BLT 3/25, and plus BLT 2/24, maintained its positions and was unable to advance on the left because of the resistance holding up the right of BLT 1/24. A prominent reentrant resulted from the inability of those two BLT's to advance; however, plans were made to drive through this area on the morning of 10 March. (g) 4th Provisional Battalion. A temporary Provisional Battalion, consisting of thirty-eight (38) Officers and four hundred eighty-eight (488) enlisted was organized from the Support Group and assembled in TA 182 Y as Division Reserve for emergency use in the rear areas. (h) 14th Marines. 1/14 was in direct support of RCT 25, 2/14 was in direct support of RCT 23, 3/14 in direct support of RCT 24, 4/14 in general support, and VAC LANFOR Artillery reinforced fires on call. Air observers fired a total of seventeen (17) missions during the period. VAC LANFOR Artillery was fired on three (3) targets which required heavy artillery. Six (6) targets were reported and were fired upon during the period from information secured by sound ranging. The total number of missions fired was 343. (i) 4th Tank Battalion. There was no changes in the assignments. At the end of the period thirty-three (33) tanks were operational, eight (8) were damaged and thirteen (13) were destroyed. Company "B" towed a 7.2 rocket launcher in the zone of BLT 1/24 and fired twenty (20) rockets. Results were not successful. (j) Aviation. CTG 52.2 and the 7th AAF continued to furnish air support. Of the eight (8) support missions requested, four (4) were completed. The remainder were cancelled because the front lines were too close to the target areas by the time these missions came in. RCT 23 reported that the P-51 mission with 500-pound delayed-action bombs was very effective. VMO-4 flew six (6) tactical observation missions. Successful tests were completed of smoke rockets fired from VMO-4 wing-mounted bazookas for target designation. One (1) VMO-4 plane, armed with six (6) smoke rockets, was available on call to designate targets for support aircraft. (k) Naval Gunfire. Because of the increased limitations under fire possibilities, the Division Naval Gunfire Support was reduced to two (2) DD's. In supporting the Division attack, fires were placed in TA's 185, 186 and 202, with two (2) VOF planes furnishing air spot. (l) 4th Engineer Battalion. There was no changes in assignments or tasks of this battalion. (m) 4th Pioneer Battalion. At 0800 the Division Shore Party was relieved by the Garrison Force. For the remainder of the period this battalion was disposed tactically for beach defense. It was directed to be prepared to assemble in Division Reserve on one (1) hour's notice. (n) Combat Efficiency remained at an estimated 45%. (o) Weather and Visibility. The weather was cool; visibility was unlimited. The Ceiling was unlimited in the morning, decreased to 1500 feet by the end of the period.