20. FROM 1800, 9 MAR 45 TO 1800, 10 MAR 45 (D PLUS 19) (a) Enemy activity during the night was relatively quiet. The front lines received a small amount of light and medium mortar fire at infrequent intervals during the night. There were several unsuccessful attempts at infiltration. In order to insure the closing of the reentrant in TA 184 CH, and to shorten the lines across the Division front, Division decided to have RCT 25 relieve BLT 1/24, the right BLT of RCT 24, with BLT 3/25, which was in Division Reserve prior to 0630. BLT 3/25 was released to RCT 25 at 0300. RCT 23, on the left, was then ordered to assume control of BLT 3/24 in its present zone at 0630. When relieved by RCT's 23 and 25, RCT 24, less BLT's 2/24 and 3/24, was ordered to assemble in TA's 182 O and 193 KL as Division Reserve. Two (2) DD's provided illumination in the Division zone during the night. (b) After a coordinated VAC LANFOR-Division Artillery preparation from King-hour minus 25 to King-hour minus 15, and from King-hour minus 10 to King- hour, moving forward in successive concentrations of 100 yards every five (5) minutes from King-hour to King-hour plus 15, the Division resumed the attack with two (2) RCT's in assault in King-hour, 0800, in accordance with VAC LANFOR Order No. 17-45, to destroy the enemy and capture the remainder of the island within its zone of action. For formation and boundaries, see the map, Progress of Attack. Line of Departure - front lines at King-hour. (c) RCT 23, on the left, less BLT 3/23, and with BLT 3/24 attached, continued the attack at King-hour with two (2) BLT's in assault, 2/23 on the left and 3/24 on the right, and with 1/23 in RCT Reserve, making its main effort on the right. Progress on the left was steady against light mortar and small arms fire coming from caves and the cliff line marking the Division boundary. On the right the advance was slow against strong enemy resistance throughout the zone. After a steady advance resulting in considerable gains, the RCT took up a favorable defensive position along a line about 400 to 600 yards from the beach. Consolidation for the night was begun at 1700. Contact was maintained from right to left within the division. At about 1500 patrols reached the coast line within the zone without encountering the enemy. AT 1115 BLT 3/23, which was in VAC LANFOR Reserve, was released to RCT control. The RCT Reserve was employed in mopping up the rear areas throughout the day. (d) RCT 25, on the right, with BLT 2/24 and the Reconnaissance Company attached, completed the relief of BLT 1/24 by BLT 3/25 at 0600 and assumed control of the zone as assigned in the attack order. See the map, Progress of Attack. At King-hour BLT's 3/25 and 1/25 jumped off in a coordinated attack supported by the fire of BLT's 2/25 and 2/24. Pivoting on the right of BLT 1/25, these two BLT's turned towards the southeast and were able to break through the reentrant and make a considerable gain during the day. During the day advance elements of BLT 1/25 were pinched out and were employed, together with units of BLT 2/25, to liquidate an area of resistance which developed in TA 184 N. At 1700, when consolidation was ordered, RCT 25 had reached the line shown on the map, Progress of Attack, and was occupying favorable ground for defense. The Division Reconnaissance Company was assigned the task of containing and destroying the enemy in TA 183 J in order to protect the rear areas from possible infiltration from caves in this vicinity. The advance of RCT 25 overran and annihilated the strong positions of the enemy and secured the commanding ground in the zone. The rear areas were mopped up as the advance was continued. (e) RCT 24, less BLT's 2/24 and 3/24, reverted to Division Reserve in TA's 182 ) and 183 KL at 0630. AT 1115, VAC LANFOR directed that BLT 1/24 be assigned to VAC LANFOR Reserve and remain in position in above TA's. (f) 4th Provisional Battalion, in Division Reserve, established defensive positions on the left of the Division zone in the rear areas. There was no activity reported during the night. During the daylight hours patrols from this battalion began mopping up operations in the Division rear areas. (g) 14th Marines. 1/14 was in direct support of RCT 25, 2/14 in direct support of RCT 23, 3/14 in direct support of RCT 24 prior to 0630, after which time it reinforced the fires of 2/14, 4/14 was in general support, and VAC LANFOR Artillery reinforced fires on call. Air observers fired one (1) fire mission during the period. The total number of missions fired was 329. (h) 4th Tank Battalion. Company "C" was attached to RCT 23, Company "A" to RCT 25, and Company "B" was under Battalion control. At the end of the period thirty-five (35) tanks were operational, six (6) damaged, and thirteen (13) destroyed. One (1) platoon of Company "C" operated with RCT 9 during the day. (i) Aviation. Two (2) missions were requested by the Division from the 7th Fighter Command, but both were cancelled because of the front lines moved forward so rapidly that the strikes could not be employed. VMO-4 flew seven (7) tactical observation missions. Beginning at 0700 this period, and daily thereafter until they were secured, close air support groups were to be composed of eight (8) P-51 aircraft, each armed with two (2) 500 pound bombs and full ammunition. Flights were to be relieved on station at two (2) hour intervals, the first flight 0700, the last flight 1700. (j) Naval Gunfire. One (1) DD with VOF air spot supported the Division during the day. Before all fire was lifted, because of the rapid advance of the Division front, one (1) mission was fired in caves in TA 185 J. The ship was held for emergency missions, and VOF air spot was employed in keeping the Division's front under observation throughout the day. (k) 4th Engineer Battalion. No change in assignments or duties. (l) 4th Pioneer Battalion, was prepared to assemble in TA 166 F on one (1) hour's notice as Division Reserve. (m) Combat Efficiency of this Division was reduced by excessive casualties, particularly to key personnel, and battle fatigue to an estimated 40%. (n) Weather and Visibility. The weather was cool and fair; visibility was unlimited; ceiling was overcast 1/10 to 2/10.