22.  FROM 1800, 11 MAR 45 TO 1800, 12 MAR 45  (D PLUS 21)

	(a)	Activity for the night consisted of sporadic mortar and small arms 
fire coming from the center of resistance in the zone of RCT 25.  The majority of 
this fire was aimless and apparently fired with no other purpose than to bolster 
the courage of the enemy.  Some infiltration was attempted from this area, but 
all attempts were unsuccessful.  One (1) DD illuminated the zone of action for the 
Division.

	(b)	Division Administrative Order No. 1-45, Warning Order for 
reembarkation, was issued at 0800.  Reembarkation was to begin on or about 14 
March.

	(c)	The Division continued the attack at King-hour plus 60, King-hour 
being 0700, in accordance with VAC LANFOR Order No. 19-45, to eliminate the 
pocket of resistance in TA 185 PQUV and to mop up throughout the zone, 
beginning at the coastline and working progressively back through the zone in 
order to destroy the remaining Japanese within the area.  Boundaries and zones 
of action - no change.

	(d)	RCT 23, on the left, employed BLT 3/24 to assist RCT 25 in containing 
the enemy in the center of resistance in TA 185 PQUV.  At King-hour this RCT, less 
BLT 3/24, began a systematic mopping up of its area from the beach toward the 
RCT rear area line.  The evacuation of Marine dead and the burial of enemy 
dead as well as a general policing of the area occupied the remainder of the 
period.

	(e)	RCT 25, with BLT's 3/25, 2/25 and 2/24 in line, at 0900 began 
mopping up operations to destroy the organized resistance in this area.  Because 
the area of this resistance was relatively small and was contained on three (3) 
sides (see the map, Progress of Attack), it was necessary to limit the weapons 
employed to small arms, mortars, and flame throwers.  The character of the 
terrain prohibited the employment of tanks. The enemy were entrenched in 
ravines, caves and man-made pillboxes, and were extremely tenacious.  In order 
to annihilate this resistance it was necessary to flush the enemy out of these 
emplacements one or two at a time.  The Division Reconnaissance Company 
was employed in mopping up the rear areas.  Detachments from RCT 
Headquarters were employed to evacuate Marine Dead and to bury enemy 
dead.

	(f)	RCT 24, less three (3) BLT's had no change.  BLT 1/24 continued in 
VAC LANFOR Reserve.

	(g)	4th Provisional Battalion.  One (1) platoon was assigned to the 
Pioneer Battalion for the defense of Beach Blue 1 during the hours of darkness. AT 
1400 the battalion was disbanded and the elements thereof reverted to parent 
control.

	(h)	14th Marines.  Four (4) battalions fired preparation fires in the 5th 
Marine Division zone from 0903 to 0913.  3/14 fired harassing fires in the zone from 
1900 to 0630 and from 0912 to 1045.  The total number of missions fired was 84.

	(i)	4th Tank Battalion.  Two (2) flame thrower tanks, without crews, 
were loaned to the 5th Marine Division.  At the end of the period, forty-one (41) 
tanks were operational, two (2) were damaged, and eleven (11) were 
destroyed.

	(j)	Aviation.  VMO-4 flew four (4) tactical observation missions, and at 
the end of the period two (2) planes were operational.

	(k)	Naval Gunfire.  One (1) DD maintained contact with the Division in 
case of emergency fires were required.

	(l)	The 4th Engineer Battalion continued operations in support of the 
RCT's.

	(m)	4th Pioneer Battalion.  No change.

	(n)	Combat Efficiency was estimated to be 36%.

	(o)	Weather and Visibility.  The weather was fair and cool, visibility was 
fair, overcast 8/10 to 10/10.