

KOREAN WAR PROJECT

**UNIT SPECIAL ACTION REPORT ANTI-TANK
COMPANY, 5TH MARINES; 1ST PROVISIONAL
MARINE BRIGADE [REIN] FMF**

ANTI-TANK COMPANY
5TH MARINES
1ST PROVISIONAL MARINE BRIGADE (REIN) FMF
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA
ASB-jcb

Unit Special Action Report

Ref: (a) MCH 11401.2a (Unit Special Action Report)

Purpose: A summarized report from 7Jul50 to 31Aug50

Mission: This unit assigned to give direct supporting fire to 5thMarRegt.

Designation: 75mm Recoilless Gun Company, 1stWpnsBn, 1stMar Div, FMF, on 7Jul50 assigned to 5thMarRegt (Rein) for operational and administrative control by 1stProvMarBrig(Rein) FMF. 5Aug50 redesignated Anti-Tank Co, 5thMar, 1stProvMarBrig(Rein) FMF BSO #7-50.

Planning: Not applicable.

Training: No training or rehearsals conducted due to preparations for embarkation on board ships.

Loading: This unit loaded all organic equipment on 11Jul50. Personnel embarked on board two ships, USS PICKAWAY (APA 222) and the USS HENRICO (APA 45). 2dPlt embarked aboard the USS PICKAWAY (APA 222) at San Diego, California on 12 July 1950 and sailed therefrom on 14 July 1950. 1 Officer, 35 enlisted USMC and 1 USN. Total 37. 1stPlt with CoHqs embarked aboard the USS HENRICO (APA 45) at San Diego, California on 13 July 1950 and sailed on 14 July 1950. 1st Plt 1 Officer, and 34 enlisted. CoHqs 1 Officer 15 enlisted.

Movement: Destination Japan. USS HENRICO arrived USNSD at Oakland, California on 16 July 1950 for mechanical repair. First Lieutenant Leo G LEWIS Jr. detached sk USN Hosp, Oak Knoll, Calif. First Lieutenant A. S. BAILEY assumed command on 17 July 1950. Enroute from 14Jul50 to 2Aug50. Arrived Pusan, Korea on 2Aug50. 3Aug50 0500 disembarked. Issued basic load of 75mm Recoilless ammunition also basic load for individual weapons and C-Rations for each individual. Attached to 1stBn 5thMar. 0630 embarked aboard vehicles and proceeded to Regt Bivouac and assembly area at Chang-won, Korea. Arrived 1300 and took up secondary positions in stream bed on the North side of the road in the Chang-won area on verbal orders from ExO 1stBn 5thMar.

Assault:

Received verbal orders from CO 5thMarRegt to attach 2dPlt to 3rdBn 5thMar. 1 Officer, 36 enlisted USMC and 1 USN. Left Anti-Tank Co control and assembly area and attached to "G" Company 5thMar. Moved into Army positions occupied by 1stBn 27th RCT near Chang dong-Ni. Ranging shots fired and ranges noted. Under weak enemy mortar and artillery fire on night of 6Aug50.

7Aug50 Remained in same position. Fired on enemy Observation Post on top dominating hill to our left front. Enemy evacuated Observation Post. Counter-battery fire forced us to temporarily cease firing and move to alternate positions. Fired at groups of enemy in open. Results unobtainable. Under sporadic enemy mortar and artillery fire.

8Aug50 Remained in same position. Fire missions conducted on enemy armored car. Results unobtainable due to extreme range (2,800 yds). Fired on suspected location of sniper in native village. Results unobtainable. Destroyed building within 100 yds of lines on verbal orders from CO 3rdBn 5thMar. Under long range Machine Gun fire in afternoon. Mortar and artillery fire also received.

9Aug50 Moved out from position at Chang dong-Ni and attached to point platoon of troops. Strafing by our own Corsairs. No casualties. Moved back to H&S Co at dusk. Set up with Bn CP and covered road within area.

10Aug50 Moved out from position attached to "G" Co 3rdBn 5thMar up with point. 1st Section with "G"Co 5thMar and 2d Section with "H"Co 5thMar while entering Kosung. Dug in at West end of city with 3rdBn 5thMar.

11Aug50 On the move all day with 3rdBn 5thMar. About 1400 turned around and returned to Nam River Area to support Army Field Artillery position from guerilla raids. Set up covering creek bed and roads.

12Aug50 Remained in position with 3rdBn 5thMar under Bn control. Fired H.E. and W.P. into native village where North Korean patrol was cornered. Results unobtainable. Patrol from this platoon searched village from which Field Artillery had been receiving sniper fire. Snipers located and eliminated.

13Aug50 Moved out with 3rdBn 5thMar to position further up road from Nam River Area. Under 3rd Bn 5thMar control. No targets.

Moved out of positions in motor march to Masan. One half Plt proceeded by train to Miryang. One half Plt via motor convoy to Pusan for night. Slept at Rear Echelon 1st ProvMar Brig at Pusan, Bivouac area.

15Aug50 Enroute to Miryang. Motor convoy arrived at Regt Bivouac area at 1500. Rail detail arrived 2000 at Regt Bivouac area and returned to company control.

16Aug50 Remained at Regt Bivouac area. A and B rations fed to troops. Two meals per day, rest and maintenance for all weapons and vehicles.

17Aug50 0530 moved out with 3rdBn 5thMar to "G"Co 5thMar for Yongsan in Nakgtong River.

1400 left "G"Co 3rdBn 5thMar to 1stBn 5thMar. Vehicles commandeered to evacuate wounded.

→ 1stPlt 6Aug50 Received verbal orders from CO 5thMar. 1stPlt assigned to 2dBn 5thMar.

7Aug50 0330 Moved out in convoy with 2dBn 5thMar to Chandong-Ni. Arrived at 0730.

Received enemy sniper and mortar fire. Dispersed troops and dug in. Received verbal orders from CO 2dBn to move out, proceed at approach march to Bn CP. Set up defense positions to cover village and road on right flank of Bn and to the rear of the CP. Received orders

(verbal) from CO WpnsCo at 1845 to cover Rocket team going into fire on village with W.P. rockets. Close fire support and overhead fire in event they drew fire from the village.

Fire Mission #1. Rocket team received Machine Gun fire from village. #1 Gun fired one round of W.P. and knocked out enemy Machine Gun. Fired four more rounds of W.P. to fire huts in village and cover return of Rocket Team return to CP area. Huts burned all night. Mission accomplished.

Received scattered enemy fire (small arms) from 8Aug50 Fire Mission #2. Received verbal orders from CO 2dBn 5thMar to deliver interdiction fire on village through out day. Fired 42 rounds during day setting fire to likely targets in the village. Fire was also delivered in support of combat patrol operating in right flank of Bn. One man evacuated 1000 to BrigAidSta.

9Aug50 One enemy killed by small arms fire while attempting to pass through defensive lines at dawn. 1730 Received verbal orders from 2dBn CO to move out in convoy at 1900. Plt relieved by 75mm RecGun Plt 5th RCT U.S. Army. Moved to assembly area at Nam River bridge.

10Aug50 Moved out in convoy. Set up Anti-Tank positions where tank fell through bridge. Covered all mechanized vehicles to approach Bn CP. Unloaded all vehicles on orders from Brig CG.

Trucks were sent forward to shuttle troops forward. Troops went by foot to 11thMar "A" Battery area. Vehicles returned at dusk. Loaded all equipment and moved forward to ScrVBtry, 11thMar Bivouac area for the night.

11Aug50 Rejoined 2dBn CP at Poedon-ni at 0800. Set up guns to cover tank approaches to front. 1400 moved out with Advance Guard of 2dBn 5thMar. Proceeded through Kosunk. Set up for night defense at Regt. West of Kosung.

12Aug50 Moved out with 2dBn 5thMar to positions 3 miles east of Sanchon. Set up Anti-Tank defense for night.

13Aug50 0700 Received orders to move back to assist Army in their lines. Set up night defense to cover mechanized approaches.

14Aug50 Moved out and proceeded to Masan via motor convoy. Arrived Masan and embarked aboard train at 1800. Departed for Miryang at 2030.

15Aug50 Arrived at Miryang and disembarked from train. Proceeded by motor convoy to Regt Bivouac area. Wons given maintenance and vehicles fueled. Preparation to moving out. returned to company control.

16Aug50 1800 departed Regt Bivouac Area with 2dBn for Yongsan, North from Miryang Sector Regt Control- Left 2dBn and joined 3rdBn to support them by fire on the left flank. Set up Guns about village of Sabu with 2dPlt "H" Co., 3rdBn no fire delivered no fire received at this position.

17Aug50 Received orders through CO 3rdBn to report to CO 1stBn at Yongsan, enroute over turned one (1) Gun rendering it unserviceable. Set up three (3) remaining Guns on bean paddies on right front baring on hill 206 (2dBn OP) to deliver direct fire on targets of opportunity on objective No 1. Fire 20 rds H.E. and 33 rds W.P. in close support of "A"Co assault. On objective #2 Knocked out one enemy mortar and several enemy observers on top of objective #1, also knocked out Machine Gun position on Objective #1. Mortar was knocked out with one (1) shot, H.E. at range of 1150 yds (direct hit).

CoHqs 7Aug50 Moved out with 1stBn 5thMar and arrived at Chang dong-Ni at 1315. Dug in at Regt CP Strength 1 Officer 13 enlisted. Furnished personnel for CP defense. Received enemy mortar and sniper fire. Covered approximately 16 miles. C-Rations fed to troops.

8Aug50 Remained in position with Regt CP. Furnished security dailey, received enemy mortar fire sparaiely.

9Aug to 15Aug50 CoHqs traveled with Regt CP and maintained liaison with the 1st and 2d Plts. Furnished security for the Regt CP nightly during it's Bivouac.

16Aug50 CoComdr accompanied Regt Staff on a reconnaissance of the forward area (Yongsan Sector) to establish a company CP. 1600 1st and 2d Plts returned to Co control.

17Aug50 1915 while at 1stBn OP reporting the entire Co to Bn CO, 1stBn for employ for the night. CO 1stBn received word of the approach of four enemy tanks approaching. The 1stPlt with 3 guns was located on the side of a hill where they had supported the infantry attack on hill #206. The 2dPlt had been brought up from reserve to the Bn CP at the base of the hill to the rear. The 1stPlt shifted guns in position to cover the approach of the tanks at the road curve and the 2dPlt moved into position with 3 guns in a ravine below and to the rear of the 1stPlt to cover the road in the event the tanks got by the 1stPlt. With the fourth gun in the same relative position as the guns of the 1stPlt. As the first tank appeared around the curve, Gun #4 fired upon the tank at the range of 350yds and broke the left track of the tank, and the other guns fired in battery, striking the forward armor plate of the tank, penetrating same. By this time the second of the four had arrived at the same position, same range, and fire was brought upon it. The third tank came around the curve and fire was brought up on it, same position, same range. The fourth tank retreated without coming within range. The following rounds by type were fired upon these three tanks:

#1 Tank 6 H.E.A.T. #2 Tank 2 H.E.A.T.
3 H.E. 8 H.E.

4 W.P.

#3 Tank 3 H.E.
3 W.P.

During this engagement, one man was injured by Machine Gun fire, sustaining wounds in the upper left arm and left side of chest, necessitating his removal to the aid station after action was completed. Also during this action, one 3.5" Rocket launcher team of this organization fired three rounds on each of the first two tanks, but results of last three rounds couldn't be observed due to smoke and flames. The first round punctured the first tank at the forward base of the turret.

Anti-Tank Co Unit Special Action Report Cont'd

18Aug50 2dPlt attached to 3rdBn and covered cross roads and Bn CP. 1stPlt attached to 1stBn. CoHqs with Regt CP.

19Aug50 Remained in position all day. Received enemy mortar and artillery fire sporadically during the day.

Embarked aboard vehicles at 1400 and arrived at Miryang Regt Bivouac area at 2100.

20Aug50 Remained in area with Regt. Received ammunition and equipment. B-Rations fed 2 meals per day.

21Aug50 0600 Embarked aboard train for Chang-won area 5thMarRegt. Departed at 0630 for Chang-won. Arrived at 0930.

21Aug to 31Aug50 Regt Bivouac Chang-won area. Training conducted daily; supplies replenished in preparation for next operation. (Eighth Army Reserve)

Estimated As evidenced by the report on tank action .Its has been Results of proved that the 75mm Reco Rifle M-20 can and will disable Operation and destroy the Russian T-34 Tank contrary to many published reports by the US Army that the projectile bounced off . None of the projectiles fired by the Guns of this organization failed to detonate or bounced off as far as can be determined. Also , it was proved that, in the type of action encountered here, the rifle is very effective in delivery very accurate supporting fire to attacking to infantry troops, some of which was delivered to within 50 yards of our elements and which was observed to destroy enemy automatic weapons placements and mortar directly in front of our advancing troops. While firing from the same positinsn from which this supporting fire was delivered other longer range missions were fired on enemy troop concentrations, OP's and emplacements , there by knocking out enemy fire potentials which had not been brought to bear on our troops yet.

Missions were fired which prohibited or restricted the action of patrols attempting to operate and observe outside small arms fire range of our troops.

Comments: Prior to and during the first phase of this operation Bn Comdr's and Junior Officer's were beleived to question the practicability of the Recoilless Rifle due to the back blast and the probability of bringing counter battery fire down on their troops. Also it is believed that they were skeptical as to the accuracy of the fire that could be delivered. Consquintly, guns were used on primary missions mostly, that of Anti-Tank protection, until the Naktong River action, at which time the 1stPlt was used very effectively in direct support of attacking troops, the secondary mission during this operation at only one time was a platoon forced to cease firing and move to alternate positions due to counter battery fire.

2. Due to the individual armanent of the company (34 men armed with pistols), it is not able to tactically operate by it's self. Yet on two occasions, a platoon was left by the Bn which it was attached, to defend it's own positions without support of infantry units.

3. 536 Radios were not practicable for use for Plt to Section communications, due either to faulty 536 or the fact that the gun positions were situated so that intervening terrain features prohibited using.
4. Normally, no communications was available from CO to Plt's. When Plt's were attached to Bn's, due to limiting range of SCR 300, the only radios assigned this organization.
5. The M-2 tripod was used and found to be impracticable due to the weight of the gun and slowing up rapid shifting of the gun on the mount. The M-1917 A-1 Mount is excellent for use as a support for firing the gun, but it's too light for usage as a mount to transport the gun on the cart utility. It has been necessary in the past to have the trail legs replaced and the ones now in use are beginning to bend. Also in transportation, the traversing and elevating mechanism becomes burred and inaccurate.
6. The lack of sufficient transportation has been the greatest limiting factor in the rapid employment of the guns. Initial ammunition supply and re-supply, and in the maintenance of liaison between CoHqs and the Plt's. It has been necessary to transport one platoon 4 guns, 4 carts, ammunition, rations, water, and personnel on an Army 6x6 and a 1 ton trailer. And the other platoons carts, guns, ammunition, rations, water and personnel in a Army 6x6 and the two vehicles were organic to the company, a truck $\frac{1}{2}$ ton and trailer $\frac{1}{2}$ ton cargo which left no transportation for the Headquarters personnel and liaison personnel, thereby sometimes necessitating absolutely serving the liaison between the Regt and the Co liaison personnel. Due to the facts mentioned in paragraph six (6) (comments), and in order to prevent putting all the guns of a platoon in one truck so that mortar, artillery or mines could disable all guns and personnel of the platoon, at one time, the following vehicles be assigned the organizations:

Recommendations:


- 1 Personnel carrier w/pedestal mount and one $\frac{3}{4}$ ton trailer, cargo, per squad, to carry the personnel, gun rations, and the basic load of ammunition for that gun, total 8 personnel carriers and 8 $\frac{3}{4}$ ton trailers
- 1 truck $\frac{1}{2}$ ton 4x4 and 1 trailer $\frac{1}{2}$ ton cargo which are now organic to this organization, for the use by Hq Section and liaison personnel.

This transportation would also alleviate the shortage of ammunition bearers, of which there are two per squad and who can carry only two rounds per man, or a total of four rounds per gun, which has been insufficient in this operation and virtually impossible for any applicable distance due to the weight. (approximately 62 lbs of the two rounds on the pack board and extreme heat) Such transportation would not only eliminate the need for constant repair of the 10-1917 A-1 mount, since the gun would be on a pedestal mount, but would permit rapid employment of the gun.

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over the heads of troops even on level ground, due to the fact that the gun can be satisfactorily employed from such a mount on a vehicle. If procurement of such vehicles be impracticable, the following vehicles be assigned this organization:
 1 truck 1½ ton 6x6 and 1 trailer 1 ton cargo per section or a total of: 4 trucks and 4 trailers,
 1 truck ½ ton 4x4 and 1 trailer ½ ton cargo, for use by CoHqs as before stated.

2. that, due to the impracticability of the 536 radio at the ranges and the situations required, SCR 300 radios be authorized as follows:



3. M-1 rifles using tracer ammunition were used successfully to determine ranges and to designate the targets for more accurate range determination and target designations at longer ranges, it is recommended that 1 M-1 Sniper Rifle be authorized each platoon.
4. That a better, non-fading dye be used for the tape which is used on the cardboard ammunition container to designate the ammunition type. The tape marking H.E.A.T. and H.E. containers faded under elements to such an extent that it was necessary to take the ammunition out of the cardboard container to determine the type.

Annexes: None

Unit Station List

LEWIS, Leo G. Jr.	1stLt	040168/0302	CO 7Jul-16Jul50
BAILEY, Almarion S.	1stLt	041735/0302	ExO 7Jul-16Jul 50- CO 17Jul-31Aug50
FIELDS, Paul R.	2dLt	049848/0302	PltLdr 1stPlt
JONES, Charles M. C. Jr.	2dLt	050146/0301	PltLdr 2dPlt

A. S. BAILEY
 1st Lt, USMC
 Commanding

ANTI-TANK COMPANY
5TH MARINES
1ST PROVISIONAL MARINE BRIGADE (REIN) FMF
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

ASB-jf1

Unit Special Action Report

Ref: (a) MCM 11401.2 a (Unit Special Action Report)

Purpose: A summarized report from 1Sep-6Sep50

Mission: This unit assigned to give direct supporting fire to 5thMarRegt.

Designation: Anti-Tank Company 5th Marines , 1stProvMarBrig (Rein)
FMF

Planning: Prepared by S-3

Training: None

Loading: Loaded equipment and Personnel on vehicles and train for Miryang, Regt Bivouac area and forward area.

Movement: 1Sep50 By vehicle and train to Mirtang, 0900 1Sep50 Received verbal orders from CO 5thMar be prepared to move out. Basic load of ammunition on hand and C-Rations. Unit of fire individual weapons.
1330 1stPlt moved out with 3rdBn 5thMar for Miryang by train . Departed Chang-won area 1500 and arrived at Regt Bivouac area at 1900.
2dPlt departed Chang-won area at 1700 for Miryang Regt Bivouac area with 1stBn 5thMar. CoHqs embarked aboard train at 1900 with 3rdBn 5thMar and departed for Regt Bivouac area at Miryang. Arrived at Miryang at 2315 and proceeded by truck to bivouac area.
2Sep50 1stPlt attached to 2dBn 5thMar moved out to the Susong-ni sector at 0645 for strategic reserve position. Arrived at Fugongnyon sector at 0900 and took up defense positions. 2dPlt departed with CoHqs and Regt CI for Susong-ni area and bivouaced over night.

Assault: 3Sep50 1stPlt attached to 2dBn 5thMar moved out at 0600 to sector East of Yongsan and on into city supporting 2dBn 5thMar and set up a Anti-Tank defense. Received verbal orders from CO 2dBn5thMar to move up and support the right flank of "E" Company. Moved into position and spotted enemy Anti-Tank Gun firing on Tanks and Army Half Tracks. Requested permission to fire from CO 2dBn 5thMar. Request granted fired mission and eliminated Anti-Tank Gun and personnel. Continued to search the area and continued burning the village. Mission accomplished. Ammunition expended: 75mmRec 12 rds H.E. 8 W.P.

Remained in position and received enemy small arms fire. Enemy Tanks in the draw spotted our positions and returned counter battery fire inflicting nine (9) casualties and two (2) KIA. Four (4) evacuated to Regt Aid Station. Five (5) treated at 2d Bn Aid Station and returned to duty. Moved to rear approximately 500 yards for reorganization. Received heavy enemy artillery and mortar fire while in this position. One (1) man wounded and evacuated to 2d Bn Aid Station. Received verbal orders from S-3 2d Bn into defense of "D" Company and moved into position. Remained in same position until 0700 4Sep50. 2d Plt moved out with 1st Bn as ordered. In direct support of infantry. Fired on villages enabling Companies "A" and "B" to advance. Received heavy enemy artillery and mortar fire as they moved into position. The platoon was ordered to fire on the enemy Observation Post causing them to withdraw from the ridge. Ammunition expended: 75mm Roc 25 H.A. rds 15 W.P. 3 H.E. A. T. CoHqs remained with Regt CP maintaining liaison with 1st and 2d Platoons. 1st Plt 4Sep50 Moved out with 3rd Bn 5th Mar for Objective No. 1. Took up position and fired on Observation Post and crew-served weapons. Mission accomplished. Set up defense positions in Nguyen sector. Ammunition expended: 75mm Roc rds 23 H.E. 10 W.P. Received heavy enemy artillery fire through-out the night. 2d Plt Continued the attack with 1st Bn 5th Mar. Primary mission: Support of Infantry. Remained in position for the night. Received heavy artillery. CoHqs remained with Regt CP maintaining liaison with 1st and 2d Platoons. 5Sep50 1st Plt jumped off in the attack at 0800 with 3rd Bn 5th Mar in direct support. Fired direct support in the To-Dong sector. Mission accomplished. 1400 received verbal orders from S-3 3rd Bn 5th Mar to withdraw to position at Sangnigok. Withdrew and set up anti-mechanized defense. Ammunition expended: 75mm Roc rds 8 H.E. 7 W.P. Relieved by 3rd Bn 23rd Army RCT at 2100. Made foot march to Yongsan area. 5Sep50 2d Plt Receiving heavy enemy artillery fire at 0100 One (1) man KIA. Continued advancing with 1st Bn 5th Mar covering tank approaches. Did not engage with enemy tanks or any other self propelled vehicles. 1600 received word from S-3 1st Bn 5th Mar that the 3rd Bn 23rd Army RCT would receive all Marine units on the line. 2100 came off the line and marched to the rear area for approximately 3 three miles and dug in for the night. CoHqs remained with Regt CP maintaining liaison with 1st and 2d Platoons. 6Sep50 1st Plt embarked aboard trucks at 0300 with 3rd Bn 5th Mar and departed for Kusan, Regt bivouac area. CoHqs embarked aboard trucks with Regt CP at 0445 and departed for Kusan Regt bivouac area.

Anti-Tank Co Unit Special Action Report Cont'd

2dPlt embarked aboard trucks with 1stBn 5thMar and departed for Pusan Regt bivouac area.

Estimated Results
of Operation:

Both platoons from this Company successfully supported by direct fire the advancing infantry units to which attached, placing heavy fire upon enemy troop concentrations, anti-tank weapons, and automatic weapons, thereby greatly assisting those infantry units in the accomplishment of their mission.

Comments:

No tanks were brought under fire by the Anti-Tank Company during this operation.

Recommendations:

None.

Annexes:

None.

Unit Station List:

BAILEY, Almarion S.	041735/0302	1stLt	MC	CO
FIELDS, Paul R.	049848/0302	2dLt	MC	PlLdr 1stPlt
JONES, Charles M.C. Jr.	050146/0301	2dLt	MC	PlLdr 2dPlt

05 / 1954
A. S. BAILEY
1stLt., USMC
Commanding