

KOREAN WAR PROJECT

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION BULLETIN 1ST MARINE DIVISION, FMF

0045-4

Headquarters
1st Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force
c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California

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INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION BULLETIN

1. Order of Battle.

a. Rehabilitation of the NK Forces (From GHQ, G-2 Intel Sum No. 3029, dtd 25 Dec 50)

Eleven reconstituted NK divisions have reappeared in the past ten days, thus bringing the total accepted NK units to twenty-six; twenty-two of which are infantry divisions, one an armored division, and three brigades. During the past six weeks many reports have stated that the NKA is undergoing an extensive training and expansion program throughout Korea and in Manchuria; this is substantiated by the identification of eight separate NK Corps. Considering that each of these Corps would have organic to it from three to five divisions, there is a definite possibility that the NKA may emerge in the near future with approximately forty major units of division and brigade size. Some reports have stated that as many as 130,000 Korean troops were undergoing training in Manchuria in late November while other reports stated that new NK units were being organized and old units reconstituted in November and early December in the Kanggye, Manpojin, and Hoeryong areas. With the manpower potential that is currently available to the NKA, it is reasonable to assume that the enemy has the capability of placing several additional NK divisions in the field in the very near future.

The fact that the NKA is composed of eight Corps, may be indicative of a plan for the occupation of South Korea, in anticipation of achieving final victory. In the present tactical situation, there is no justification for the existence of eight Corps in the NKA. However, it is interesting to note that the eight NK Corps organization coincides with the provincial structure of South Korea, and the plan may be to use one Corps for administration of each of the South Korean provinces.

b. North Korean Corps Organization.

Latest available information has the subordination of the North Korean Corps as follows:

- I Corps - 8th, 17th and 47th Rifle Divisions; 125th Armored Divisions.
- II Corps - 2nd, 4th, 7th, 9th, 10th, 27th and 43rd Rifle Divisions.
- III Corps - 1st, 3rd and 5th Rifle Divisions.
- IV Corps - 41st Rifle Division; 227th, 507th and 509th Rifle Brigades.
- V Corps - 6th, 12th, 15th, 31st and 38th Rifle Divisions.

[Redacted]

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VIII Corps - 77th Rifle Division.

Unknown - 13th, 19th, 32nd and 46th Rifle Division and
3rd Rifle Brigade.

c. Subordination of North Korean Rifle Divisions.

(1) 1st Rifle Division (Reconstituted)

1st Rifle Regiment

2nd Rifle Regiment

3rd Rifle Regiment

Artillery Regiment

Estimated strength as of 27 December 50 - 5825.

(2) 2nd Rifle Division

6th Rifle Regiment

4th Rifle Regiment

17th Rifle Regiment

Artillery Regiment

Estimated strength as of 27 December 50 - 2865.

(3) 3rd Rifle Division (Reconstituted)

7th Rifle Regiment

8th Rifle Regiment

9th Rifle Regiment

Artillery Regiment

Estimated strength as of 27 December 50 - 5840.

(4) 4th Rifle Division

5th Rifle Regiment

14th Rifle Regiment

16th Rifle Regiment

Artillery Regiment

Estimated strength as of 27 December 50 - 2850.

(5) 5th Rifle Division (Reconstituted)

10th Rifle Regiment

11th Rifle Regiment

12th Rifle Regiment

Artillery Regiment

Estimated strength as of 27 December 50 - 2865.

(6) 6th Rifle Division (Reconstituted)

15th Rifle Regiment

? Rifle Regiment

? Rifle Regiment

Artillery Regiment

Estimated strength as of 27 December 50 - 2865.

(7) 7th Rifle Division (Reconstituted)

? Rifle Regiment

? Rifle Regiment

? Rifle Regiment

Artillery Regiment

Estimated strength as of 27 December 50 - 2865.

(8) 8th Rifle Division (Reconstituted)
? Rifle Regiment
? Rifle Regiment
? Rifle Regiment
Artillery Regiment

Estimated strength as of 27 December 50 - ?

(9) 9th Rifle Division
? Rifle Regiment
? Rifle Regiment
? Rifle Regiment
Artillery Regiment

Estimated strength as of 27 December 50 - 2705

(10) 10th Rifle Division
25th Rifle Regiment
27th Rifle Regiment
28th Rifle Regiment
Artillery Regiment

Estimated strength as of 27 December 50 - 3840.

(11) 12th Rifle Division
50? Rifle Regiment
51? Rifle Regiment
52? Rifle Regiment
Artillery Regiment

Estimated strength as of 27 December 50 - 3600 (PW)

(12) 13th Rifle Division
? Rifle Regiment
? Rifle Regiment
? Rifle Regiment
Artillery Regiment

Estimated strength as of 27 December 50 - 3840.

(13) 15th Rifle Division
? Rifle Regiment
? Rifle Regiment
? Rifle Regiment
Artillery Regiment

Estimated strength as of 27 December 50 - 3840.

(14) 17th Rifle Division
? Rifle Regiment
? Rifle Regiment
? Rifle Regiment
Artillery Regiment

Estimated strength as of 27 December 50 - 3745

(15) 19th Rifle Division
? Rifle Regiment
? Rifle Regiment
? Rifle Regiment
Artillery Regiment

Estimated strength as of 27 December 50 - 5820.

(16) 27th Rifle Division
17th ? Rifle Regiment
22nd ? Rifle Regiment
32nd ? Rifle Regiment
Artillery Regiment

Estimated strength as of 27 December 50 - 2865

(17) 31st Rifle Division (Reconstituted)
? Rifle Regiment
? Rifle Regiment
? Rifle Regiment
Artillery Regiment

Estimated strength as of 27 December 50 - 4854.

(18) 32nd Rifle Division (Tentatively identified).
? Rifle Regiment
? Rifle Regiment
? Rifle Regiment
Artillery Regiment

Estimated strength as of 27 December 50 - 9682.

(19) 39th Rifle Division
? Rifle Regiment
? Rifle Regiment
? Rifle Regiment
Artillery Regiment

Estimated strength as of 29 December 50 - 4000

(20) 41st Rifle Division (Reconstituted)
71 ? Rifle Regiment
72 ? Rifle Regiment
73 ? Rifle Regiment
Artillery Regiment

Estimated strength as of 27 December 50 - 4810.

(21) 43rd Rifle Division
68th Rifle Regiment
? Rifle Regiment
? Rifle Regiment
Artillery Regiment

Estimated strength as of 27 December 50 - 3840

(22) 45th Rifle Division (Tentatively identified)
? Rifle Regiment
? Rifle Regiment
? Rifle Regiment
Artillery Regiment

(23) 46th Rifle Division
? Rifle Regiment
? Rifle Regiment
? Rifle Regiment
Artillery Regiment

Estimated strength as of 27 December 50 - 6651.

(17) 197th Infantry Division - 66th Army
589th Infantry Regiment
590th Infantry Regiment
591st Infantry Regiment

(18) 198th Infantry Division - 66th Army
592nd Infantry Regiment
593rd Infantry Regiment
594th Infantry Regiment

THIRD FIELD ARMY
6th Army Group

(19) 58th Infantry Division - 20th Army
172nd Infantry Regiment
173rd Infantry Regiment
174th Infantry Regiment

(20) 59th Infantry Division - 20th Army
175th Infantry Regiment
176th Infantry Regiment
177th Infantry Regiment

(21) 60th Infantry Division - 20th Army
178th Infantry Regiment
179th Infantry Regiment
180th Infantry Regiment

(22) 88th Infantry Division - 30th Army
262nd Infantry Regiment
263rd Infantry Regiment
264th Infantry Regiment

(23) 89th Infantry Division - 30th Army
265th Infantry Regiment
266th Infantry Regiment
267th Infantry Regiment

(24) 90th Infantry Division - 30th Army
268th Infantry Regiment
269th Infantry Regiment
270th Infantry Regiment

(25) 94th Infantry Division - 32nd Army
280th Infantry Regiment
281st Infantry Regiment
282nd Infantry Regiment

(26) 95th Infantry Division - 32nd Army
283rd Infantry Regiment
284th Infantry Regiment
285th Infantry Regiment

(27) 96th Infantry Division - 32nd Army
286th Infantry Regiment
287th Infantry Regiment
288th Infantry Regiment

(28) 79th Infantry Division - 27th Army
235th Infantry Regiment
236th Infantry Regiment
237th Infantry Regiment

(29) 80th Infantry Division - 27th Army
238th Infantry Regiment
239th Infantry Regiment
240th Infantry Regiment

(30) 81st Infantry Division - 27th Army
241st Infantry Regiment
242nd Infantry Regiment
243rd Infantry Regiment

8TH ARMY GROUP

(31) 76th Infantry Division - 26th Army
225th Infantry Regiment
227th Infantry Regiment
228th Infantry Regiment

(32) 77th Infantry Division - 26th Army
238th Infantry Regiment
239th Infantry Regiment
240th Infantry Regiment

(33) 78th Infantry Division - 26th Army
232nd Infantry Regiment
233rd Infantry Regiment
234th Infantry Regiment

2. Enemy Air Information: (From GHQ Intell Sum).

a. Estimated Enemy Air Strength and Disposition:

The Chinese Communist Air Force, which has been committed to the Korean conflict, under whatever guise, is now estimated to have available a minimum of 600 combat aircraft. This increase of 100 over previous estimates is the result of a late November influx of approximately 100 aircraft, probably IL-10 ground attack type, into Manchuria.

In considering the total number of aircraft available to the CCAF, the assumption is made that the approximately 200 aircraft of the Soviet Air Force believed to be in China, and included in the figure of 600, are either available now to the CCAF or would become so prior to the launching of an all-out air effort in Korea.

This estimate of 600 combat aircraft is broken down as follows: 250 fighters of MIG-15 jet, LA-7, LA-9, YAK-9, and P-51 models; 125 IL-10 ground attack; 150 TU-2 twin-engine bombers; and, 75 transports of C-46, C-47 and possibly IL-12 models.

Enemy aircraft have been sighted either operating or staging from Antung (XE 0933). In addition they are probably utilizing air facilities at Mukden, Kaiyuan, Chang Chun, Harbin, Chiamussu and possibly Ta-Tung-ku. Although other air facilities from which the enemy is operating are not yet known, there are sufficient facilities available in Manchuria to accommodate all of the above-mentioned aircraft.

In addition, the following known North Korean air facilities are believed to be serviceable and available to the enemy:

- (1) Sinuiju (XE 1939), (2) Sinuiju-ne (XE 2545), (3) Hoeryong (EB 6096), (4) Kanggye (EA 9832), (5) Uiju (XE 2846), (6) Pyongyang (CY 4125), (7) Pyongyang East (YD 2486), (8) Kangdong (BU 4936), (9) Wonsan (CU 6535), (10) Sondok (CV 6801), (11) Onjong-ni (XD 9205), (12) Pyonggang (CT 5252), (13) Sinmak (BT 5955), (14) Chongjin (IB 6265), and, (15) Hoemun (EA 5368).

b. Enemy Air Capabilities:

In view of the minimum of 600 combat aircraft now believed to be operating in China and Manchuria, it is obvious that the enemy air force is currently capable of mounting a major and sustained air effort at any time.

These aircraft are believed to be capable of launching some 450 fighter and 175 bomber sorties over an initial 24-hour period. Maximum and effective utilization of these aircraft would enable the enemy to: (1) Divert a considerable portion of the UN air effort from the direct support of ground action; (2) Hinder the UN air lift in Korea; (3) Strike UN vessels and installations in and near Korea and possibly those on or near Kyushu and southern Honshu; and, (4) Possibly effectively support enemy ground actions.

3. Tactics and Weapons:

a. New Tactics and Weapons or Other Material:

The following is an extract from Periodic Intelligence Report Number 78, Hq 1 US Corps, dated 2 December 1950, paragraph 3a: After a period in which little or no contact with our troops had been maintained, the enemy executes probing attacks to locate our positions. The enemy creates as much confusion as possible during these attacks, attempting by various means to force us to disclose our positions. Enemy with the ability to speak English have been used to shout demands to surrender or to give misleading orders. In one instance, one of a group of CCF troops called to our troops "We're GI's, don't shoot." Upon being allowed to come closer, these enemy opened fire. Another tactic has been to use a large volume of tracer fire in order to draw return fire and thereby disclose friendly positions. It is suggested that a means of countering such tactics is the use of grenades in place of small arms fire, and the indoctrination of our troops with the knowledge that the CCF are not "Supermen," but trained soldiers using "tricks of the trade."

b. Chinese Communist Tactics. (From GHQ, G-2 Intel Sum No. 3020, Dtd 15/16 Dec 50) - The following information is extracted from a captured enemy document. It was initially prepared in the 39th CCF Army (Corps) and republished by the Headquarters of the 66th CCF Army (Corps). It may be assumed that the information has been widely disseminated throughout the CCF in Korea and possibly elsewhere. Source: ATIS Translation #201371.

Our Combat Plan

1. Offensive Tactics:

a. Preparation for Attack: Special point on preparation against

the enemy defense positions; our advance troops must be near the enemy position in order to find out their location and formation. The methods are as follows:

1. As a first step, you must be able to advance or fall back. As a main objective, one of the units must fight its way rapidly around the enemy and cut off their rear.
2. With one of our troop units and 60mm mortars be ready to move at night to the enemy's positions. Without fear, a party with small arms should maneuver around the enemy's flank taking care not to fire too early and expose their own position.
3. The location of the position for attack must be secured by construction of strong fortifications both front and rear.
 - a. At night we must advance and feel out the enemy position and then return immediately to attack their positions where fire power is weak.
 - b. Have representatives of the different units assemble to study and analyze the terrain so it may be used to advantage against the enemy.
 - c. At dawn or dusk be ready to go into our own defensive positions. Keep well-concealed against enemy aircraft in daylight.
 - d. Keep away from roads used by the enemy. These are to be under observation at all times.

b. Offensive Methods:

1. We must first surround the enemy and cut off their routes of supply and retreat.
2. The formation for attack must have a front and depth. Using the triangle formation, the force advancing towards the enemy front must not be composed of more than two-thirds of the strength, or two of the three echelons. The forward advancing units must carry all the weapons and grenades possible.
3. At night use the four front attack to scatter the enemy fire and cause the enemy tanks or planes to lose their effectiveness, but avoid scattering.
4. It is most important to have courage to infiltrate enemy territory. If you meet enemy resistance, side-step them and try again. Keep trying until you find out the enemy's organization of position, then annihilate the enemy.
5. All commanding officers must have close coordination and liaison with the second echelon because, in night attack, it is very easy to lose contact and sense of direction.
6. Take care of those who were defeated in the first attack and who pretend to be dead. The second echelon will search them out before they have a chance to cause any confusion.
7. Route of attack must avoid highways and flat terrain in order to keep tanks and artillery from hindering the attack operation.

c. Use of Artillery:

1. The strength of the enemy will determine the type of weapon to be used against the enemy. The "School of Commanding Officers" (School name) teaches the power of various weapons and can be used as a guide.

2. The battalion mortars and 60mm mortars' important function is that of attacking for their targets enemy fire power and scattered groups.

3. The regimental flat trajectory weapons and heavy mortars must all together support the forward echelons' attack on enemy targets and weapons in the vicinity to keep the enemy under constant fire.

4. Use the Divisions' rocket launchers when necessary. It must be for important enemy position. In a fast advance we are also able to use the rockets to aid the advance. Must have a stationary point before use on enemy target. Use it to block the highway by disabling enemy vehicles.

5. The artillery observation post must be near the enemy's front line and, at all times, must be able to observe enemy movement and shifting of positions in order to keep them under control.

2. Defense Problem:

a. Establishment of Defense Positions:

1. If the enemy manpower is weak they will be afraid of close-in fighting and depend on artillery and tanks to shell us and destroy and capture our positions. We must be prepared to defend against strafing by enemy planes, incendiary bombs, bombardment, and antitank guns. If in mountain defense where tanks cannot ascend, then it is only necessary to defend against flat trajectory guns on those tanks.

2. Pick a defense position properly camouflaged where tanks will be unable to reach. The best position is a mountain corridor with a highway running along it at the base.

3. In the building of fortifications, defiladed areas and caves should be selected and concealed. In addition, a dummy position should be constructed at an exposed spot on top of a mountain in a conspicuous area to attract the enemy, and therefore receive them and draw their fire.

4. Installations must be small in number and scattered and concealed so that at any moment they can be moved quickly. In addition, they must be well camouflaged and protected from bombing.

5. All dry grass or dead wood at the defense position must be cleared and burned to prevent fire from incendiary or fire bombs.

b. Distribution of Manpower:

1. If many lines in depth are desired, the distribution of men at the front lines should be small but the amount of automatic weapons should be sufficient to secure the positions.

2. In front of the defense positions or on the flanks where tanks can easily come close and hide off the road with their equipment, we must have the proper equipment placed to fight off these tanks.

3. Before forcing and entering the enemys' main positions send out troops with fixed bayonets, increase the number of weapons, and attack early in the morning. Use the fire power and bayonets to inflict the greatest damage on the enemy.

4. At night, dispatch a small but powerful patrol with an officer in charge, and, making use of concealment, they should not be afraid to advance through the lines to reconnoiter. After obtaining information, including that on artillery positions, increase the strength of attack positions on the flanks and prepare to meet the enemy's attack.

5. When the enemy mortars and tanks are advancing to attack during fog and cold weather and when only a few are on the lookout, we maneuver around their tanks and instantly open fire to inflict damage.

6. With only a few of our artillery men, wait in concealment on the flanks for the enemy to attack, then when the attack comes, commence shelling immediately from the flank positions.

7. (TN: Illegible.)

8. Using more artillery pieces to carry on a short concentrated sweeping barrage on the point of attack, it is possible to make a night attack with a few troops following up with a large force to attack and annihilate the enemy.

9. The movement for setting up a defense from a battalion size unit on up should be completed not long after dark. After this, prepare definite plans to carry on an engagement.

Notes: 1. Night warfare in mountainous terrain must have a definite plan and liaison between platoon commands. Small leading patrol groups attack and then sound the bugle. A large number will at that time, follow in column. However, establishment of contact is difficult on account of the frequent shifting of troops here and there.

2. In night attack, pay strict attention to formation, without haste or interruption, and avoid losses through enemy attack.

3. Send out small groups to search out the enemy under cover on both flanks. The members of these groups must keep together and not get lost, so that they can better resist counterattacks.

c. Resisting Tanks (Anti-tank Work):

1. Light tanks can be disabled by a direct hit from rockets. Medium tanks can be disabled by rockets within 500 meters.

2. We have no effective weapon against heavy tanks. However, we can use 15 Chin TNT or, approximately 20 pounds of TNT charges to hit the belly or tread of the tank. This type of tank can be disabled when hit in the belly.

3. Use different kinds of flat trajectory shells to hit the tank from the rear. When hit, the tank will burn from the inside. Or, use three to five tanks with flat trajectory weapons to hit the tank from the rear to disable it.

4. TNT is used especially to disable tanks. An anti-tank section of four men carries TNT in packages of five and 20 pounds. Two men carry 20 pound packages and the other two men carry five pound packages.

5. When attacking tanks first kill the tank crew and then the infantry men following the tanks. This is another experience (practiced method) in anti-tank work.

6. When tanks enter city streets, first knock out the leading tank, then disable all following vehicles by attack with our tanks.

7. If many tanks come, first knock out the leading tanks, then the last tank, followed by destruction of the remaining tanks, one by one.

8. The tank has great power, but if kept in operation too long, it becomes overheated and slows up. At that time a grenade can be thrown into the driver's compartment, killing the operator and destroying the tank.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL SMITH:

G.A. WILLIAMS
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Chief of Staff

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Colonel, USMC
ACofS, G-2

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