

# **KOREAN WAR PROJECT**

**OPERATION CHANGIE-CHANGIE;  
BRIEFING PLAN; STATISTICS MARINE  
HELICOPTER TRANSPORT SQUADRON 161**

UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS  
MARINE HELICOPTER TRANSPORT SQUADRON 161  
1STMAW, C/O FLEET POST OFFICE  
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

JED:lfn  
4-3  
Ser 0143  
7 Feb 1952

[REDACTED]  
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From: Commanding Officer, Marine Helicopter Transport Squadron 161  
To: Commanding General, First Marine Division

Subj: OPERATION CHANGIE-CHANGIE

Ref: (a) Map: AMS L-751 Korea, 1:50,000, Sections 6829 IV, 6929 II,  
and 6929 III

Encl: (1) Briefing Form  
(2) Statistics

DOWNGRADED AT 5 YEAR INTERVALS;  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
DOD DIR 8200.10

1. MISSION:

To transport by helicopter the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines, from X-83 (DT 307-332) to four (4) landing sites located in the immediate vicinity of Hill 884 (DT 364-498); and to return the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, from this area to X-83.

2. PURPOSE:

To determine the practicability of utilizing landing sites located within the company sectors on Hill 884 in an operation of this type.

3. PLANNING PHASE:

a. Upon receipt of orders from the Commanding General, First Marine Division, to conduct OPERATION CHANGIE-CHANGIE, HMR-161 effected liaison with the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines; the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, and established the following:

- (1) That the operation would commence on 10 January 1952 at 0715, weather permitting.
- (2) That ten (10) aircraft would participate in the operation.
- (3) That the maximum payload for the aircraft would be 1,200 pounds and would consist of either five (5) combat equipped troops or four (4) combat equipped troops and equipment organic to the battalion.
- (4) That landing sites already constructed on the company level on Hill 884 would be used for this operation.
- (5) That two (2) sites would be located at X-83; one (1) designated RED, and the other designated YELLOW.
- (6) That these sites would be used as loading sites for the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines, and unloading sites for the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines.
- (7) That the operation would be divided into two (2) phases; the first phase being to effect the relief of the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, flanks; the second phase being to effect the relief of its center elements.
- (8) That 975 troops of the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, would be airlifted from Hill 884 to X-83.
- (9) That 950 troops of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines, would be airlifted from X-83 to Hill 884.

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(10) That a request would be made for an observation aircraft to remain over Hill 884 during the entire operation to spot enemy fire.

(11) That in the event of serious enemy opposition the operation would be terminated and completed the following day.

(12) That for the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines, the following plan would be effected:

(a) That two companies would be transported by truck from the 7th Marines C.P. to X-83 and be assembled at their respective loading sites by 0645, 10 January 1952.

(b) That the company assigned to the YELLOW loading site would be airlifted to YELLOW landing site #1 (DT 371-516) (right flank).

(c) That the company assigned to the RED loading site would be airlifted to RED landing site #1 (DT 354-496) (left flank).

(d) That the remaining troops of the battalion would be transported by truck from the 7th Marines C.P. to X-83 by 1100, 10 January 1952.

(e) That these troops would be divided into two groups as befitted the tactical situation and assigned to the RED and YELLOW loading sites.

(f) That the troops of this wave assigned to the YELLOW loading site would be airlifted to YELLOW landing site #2 (DT 364-498) and the troops assigned to the RED loading site would be airlifted to RED landing site #2 (DT 364-495) (center).

(g) That two helicopters would be assigned on 8 January 1952, to familiarize the troops with the proper procedure for loading, seating, and debarking from the helicopter.

(13) That for the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, the following plan would be effected:

(a) That three loading sites on Hill 884 would be assigned and utilized as follows:

1. YELLOW #1 - (DT 317-516) for the company on the right flank.

2. RED #1 - (DT 354-496) for the company on the left flank.

3. RED #3 - (DT 360-497) for the center sector.

(b) That all troops who could be relieved from the lines early would be stationed at RED loading site #3 and be picked-up during the early phase of the operation.

(c) That because some sites were cut into the sides of hills, paths to them had to be altered to prevent the troops from being hit by the rotor blades of the helicopter.

(d) That on 9 January 1952, one aircraft would be dispatched to the loading sites to insure that necessary alterations were satisfactory.

(e) That trucks would be standing by at X-83 to transport the troops to the Regimental Reserve Area.

[REDACTED]

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b. After completing the planning phase with the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, and the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines, the Commanding Officer, Air Delivery Platoon, was contacted and the following plan established:

(1) That the C.O., A.D.P., would be liaison officer between the squadron and the two (2) battalions during the operation.

(2) That a radio operator equipped with an MAW would be stationed at RED landing site #2.

(3) That the first RED aircraft would take off at 0715, 10 January 1952, from X-83 and transport three (3) Air Delivery personnel to RED landing site #3 and three (3) Air Delivery personnel to RED landing site #1.

(4) That the first YELLOW aircraft would take off at 0715 from X-83 and transport three (3) Air Delivery personnel to YELLOW landing site #2, and three (3) Air Delivery personnel to YELLOW landing site #1.

(5) That the second RED aircraft would take off from X-83 at 0715 and transport the C.O., A.D.P., the radio operator, and three (3) Air Delivery personnel to RED landing site #2.

(6) That a briefing for all pilots and Air Delivery personnel would be conducted in the squadron Operations Tent at 1900, 9 January 1952.

#### 4. EXECUTION PHASE:

a. At 0715, 10 January 1952, the first two (2) aircraft took off from X-83 as scheduled and commenced the operation. In general, the same procedure as outlined in the planning phase and the briefing form (Enclosure (1)) was followed; however, unexpected problems did arise which are listed below:

(1) At 1515, four (4) aircraft were diverted from the operation for other commitments and did not return until 1620. This reduced the number of aircraft participating in the lift to six (6) and lengthened the operation to such an extent that it was not completed until after night-fall.

(2) The MAW on RED landing site #2 was inoperative and the liaison officer stationed on the site was unable to pass instructions to the pilots of aircraft landing on other sites.

(3) No communications existed between the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, and the liaison officer which made it impossible for him to ascertain the number of outbound troops still remaining on Hill 884 during the late phase of the operation.

#### 5. DISCUSSION:

OPERATION CHANGE-CHANGE was the fourth operation of its type conducted on Hill 884 and differed from the others only in that troops were landed on and loaded from sites constructed on the company level instead of the battalion level. The entire scheme of the operation was dictated by one major consideration; the terrain.

Because of the mountainous terrain in this part of the Division Sector, helicopters were able to fly in defilade throughout the entire approach, landing, and retirement, and were therefore able to land troops within 200 yards of their positions.

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By landing troops this close to the front lines, the time required to effect the relief of each company was substantially reduced which, in effect, increased the efficiency of the operation in that 95% of the trips made by the helicopters carried a payload on both their inbound and outbound flights.

6. CONCLUSIONS:

a. That in terrain which affords the helicopter concealment in the approach, landing, and retirement, troops can be successfully landed on or very near the front lines.

b. That communications were inadequate and that in an operation of this type positive communications must exist between the infantry units involved and the supporting helicopter squadron.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. From experience gained in this and similar operations, the following recommendations are submitted:

(1) That the FAC of the unit being relieved maintain communications with each landing site and the helicopters.

(2) That the FAC of the unit being relieved maintain communications with the liaison officer of the helicopter squadron.

(3) That the unit being relieved station a liaison officer at the landing sites (X-83) whose duties include keeping a record of the number of troops that had been lifted from the forward area.

K. B. MC CUTCHEON

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CMC  
CINCPACFLT  
COMNAVFE  
CG FMF PAC  
CG FMF LANT  
CG AIR FMF PAC  
CG AIR FMF LANT  
CG FMAW  
CMCS(5)  
PACFLT COMBAT EVAL BD  
CO HMX-1  
CO HMR-261  
CO HMR-262  
CO HMR-162  
CO HMR-163

MARINE HELICOPTER TRANSPORT SQUADRON 161  
1STMAW, C/O FLEET POST OFFICE  
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

JRD:lfm  
A4-3  
9 Jan 1952

PILOT BRIEFING FORM AND FLIGHT SCHEDULE

[REDACTED]  
CONFIDENTIAL  
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1. MISSION:

a. To transport by helicopter the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines, from X-83 (DT 307-332) to four (4) landing sites on Hill 884 (DT 364-498), and to return the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, from Hill 884 (DT 364-498) to X-83 (DT 307-332).

2. H-HOUR:

- a. Reveille: 0515
- b. Breakfast: 0530
- c. Warm-up: 0630, top tanks
- d. Take-off: 0715, for 1 YELLOW and 2 RED aircraft  
0725, remaining aircraft (see flight schedule)

3. LANDING SITES:

a. The landing sites on Hill 884 are as follows:

- (1) YELLOW #1 - DT 371-516
- (2) YELLOW #2 - DT 364-498
- (3) RED #1 - DT 354-496
- (4) RED #2 - DT 364-495
- (5) RED #3 - DT 360-497

b. During the first phase of the operation RED aircraft will transport one (1) Company from RED loading zone at X-83 (Ball Diamond) to RED landing site #1. At the same time, YELLOW aircraft will transport one (1) company from YELLOW loading zone at X-83 (East of Operations Tent) to YELLOW landing site #1. RED and YELLOW aircraft will pick-up returning troops from the landing sites where inbound troops are deplaned.

c. The second phase of the operation is to transport one (1) Company of troops, plus H&S and Weapons Company, of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines, sites on Hill 884. RED and YELLOW aircraft will pick-up returning troops at RED #3 landing site.

4. AIR DELIVERY PLATOON:

a. Three (3) Air Delivery Platoon men will be assigned to each landing site, they will assist in the landing of aircraft, loading and unloading of troops, and will open and close the cabin door. The Commanding Officer, Air Delivery Platoon, the squadron doctor, and one (1) radio operator with an MAW will be placed at RED #2 landing site. The commanding Officer, Air Delivery Platoon, will act as a liaison officer between the pilots and the landing teams to insure the proper flow of troops from landing sites. He

Enclosure (1)  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

will have communications with aircraft via the MAW on channel RED 142.02.

b. The first RED aircraft off at 0715 from X-83 will carry six (6) members of the Air Delivery Platoon; three (3) will be taken to RED landing site #3; and three (3) will be taken to RED landing site #1. The aircraft will pick-up five (5) troops at RED #1 and return to RED loading zone at X-83.

c. The first YELLOW aircraft off at 0715 from X-83 will carry six (6) members of the Air Delivery Platoon; three (3) men will be taken to YELLOW landing site #2; and three (3) to YELLOW landing site #1. The aircraft will pick-up five (5) troops at YELLOW landing site #1 and return to YELLOW loading zone at X-83.

d. The second RED aircraft off at 0715 from X-83 will carry the squadron doctor, C.O., Air Delivery Platoon, one (1) radio operator, and three (3) members of the Air Delivery Platoon to RED landing site #2. The aircraft will pick-up five (5) troops at RED #1 and return to RED loading zone at X-83.

5. OPERATIONS DUTY OFFICER:

a. There will be an Operations Duty Officer at X-83. He will maintain positive control of the aircraft via the communications jeep on Channel RED (142.02).

7. COMMUNICATIONS:

- a. Primary frequency: 142.02 - Channel RED
- b. Secondary frequency: 3410 MHF
- c. X-83 (Zig Zag Base): 142.02 - Communications jeep
- d. Zig Zag ABLE (RED landing site #2): 142.02 MAW
- e. Aircraft call sign: Zig Zag (Modex No.)

8. REFUELING:

a. Refueling will be done at X-83, the following refueling points are designated:

- (1) Point #1 - HR-1's parking spot.
- (2) Point #2 - HR-11's parking spot.
- (3) Point #3 - Air Delivery Loading Site.

9. Routes to be flown from X-83 and Hill 884:

a. Aircraft will fly valley route, staying in defilade at all times possible.

b. Aircraft will keep to the left of the valleys.

10. General Information:

a. Number of men to be moved:

Enclosure (1)

[REDACTED]

(1) X-83 to Hill 884 - 950 men.

(2) Hill 884 to X-83 - 975 men.

b. Total number of trips:

(1) 200 (twenty trips per aircraft utilizing 10 aircraft).

c. Estimated time to complete operation:

(1) 8 hours and 45 minutes.

d. Maximum aircraft gross weight:

(1) 6,850 pounds.

JAMES R. DYER  
Operations Officer

Enclosure (1)

[REDACTED]



JPD:lfm

#1.

OPERATION CHANGE-CHANGE STATISTICS

Number of Flights	223
Number of Troops Carried	1,933
First Aircraft Took-Off	0715
Last Aircraft Landed	1840
Aircraft Time	93.3 Hours
Total Time to Complete the Operation	11 Hours 25 Minutes
Total Fuel Consumed	4,300 Gallons
Average Refueling Time	7 Minutes
Number of Aircraft Participating	10 For Ten Hours 6 For One Hour and 25 Minutes.

Enclosure (2)