

KOREAN WAR PROJECT

OPERATION HAYLIFT, REPORT ON - STATISTICS

MARINE HELICOPTER TRANSPORT SQUADRON 161
1STMAW, C/O FLEET POST OFFICE
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

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4 October 1952

YEAR
AFTER 12 YEARS
5200.10

UNCLASSIFIED

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, First Marine Division

Subject: OPERATION HAYLIFT, report on

RECORD SECTION, M.C.S.

S. C. FILES

Ref: (a) Map: Korea 1:50,000 AMS Series L-751 Sheets 6257 I & II, 6528
I & Overlay
(b) Operation Order 9-52

RECEIVED FROM: _____

DATE: 4 OCT 1952

Encl: (1) Statistics

TO FILE NO. _____

1. MISSION:

In accordance with reference (b), Marine Helicopter Transport Squadron 161 logistically supports the right MLR (7th Marine Regiment) by helicopter with all class I, III, V supplies for a period of five (5) days beginning at H Hour, Dog Day. The cargo lifted will be approximately Seventy Seven Thousand (77,000) pounds per day. Mail will be lifted from K-16 and all message center runs will be performed by helicopter.

2. PURPOSE:

- a. To evaluate under combat conditions the feasibility of logistically supporting with Class I, III, V, a Marine Regiment on the line, by Helicopter.
- b. To determine the planning factors involved in a mission of this nature, such as number of aircraft, time to accomplish etc. To ascertain the possibility of rendering support if rain, or snow, or other causes rendered roads or bridges impassable.

PHASE I

3. PLANNING PHASE:

a. By direction of G-3 First Marine Division, direct liaison was established between this organization, the G-4, First Marine Division, and Commanding Officer and S-4 7th Marines.

b. The following facts were established at the conference:

(1) That supplies would be airlifted from four (4) sites at each of two (2) loading zones to four (4) unloading sites as follows:

Loading Zone ABLE - 1st Service Battalion - Class I, III

Loading Zone BAKER - ASP - 14 Class V

Unloading Sites: 7th Marine Command Post
1st Battalion, 7th Marines
2nd Battalion, 7th Marines
3rd Battalion, 7th Marines

(2) That landing sites previously constructed in the 7th Marine area be utilized. At both loading zones baseball diamonds would serve the purpose and would be used.

(3) That each landing site would be designated by a colored panel. Both loading zones would display all four colored panels, each color corresponding to a landing site.

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[REDACTED]

(4) That cargo would be carried externally in nets or wire baskets, except for fragile items or extremely valuable items (mail) which would be loaded internally.

(5) That the maximum weight of the aircraft would be seven thousand (7, 000) pounds, and the maximum payload would be one thousand (1000) pounds.

(6) That the First Service Battalion would move Class I, II, III, and IV supplies to helicopter loading zone ABLE; that First Ordnance Battalion would move Class V supplies to helicopter loading Zone BAKER.

(7) That Air Delivery Platoon personnel would designate the load and dispatch aircraft under supervision of HMR-161 Operation Duty Officer. That Shore Party would move cargo from the trucks to the nets and baskets and assist in loading the aircraft.

(8) That a representative of the First Service Battalion would be stationed at Zone ABLE and a representative of the First Ordnance Battalion at Zone BAKER to inform ADP of destination of all cargo.

(9) That the cargo to be airlifted, in general, would consist of the following:

(a) Class I

(1) Rations

(b) Class III

(1) Fuel (Fifty five (55) gallon drums)

(c) Class V

(1) All types

In addition certain items of Class II and IV would be delivered if feasible.

(10) That the largest cube of cargo carried would be gasoline in fifty five (55) gallon drums, except for certain items of Class II.

(11) That the routes of approach and retirement would be governed by the terrain and aircraft would remain in defilade whenever practicable. (refer reference (a) overlay).

(12) That in the event of serious enemy resistance, the operation would be terminated for that day and continued again the succeeding day.

(13) That aircraft would be refueled at zones ABLE and BAKER. That aircraft maintenance site be established at zone ABLE.

(14) That the Commanding Officer, Air Delivery Platoon would establish the following:

(a) A cargo loading team at each loading site, consisting of a loading team chief, a signalman and two (2) cargo handlers.

(b) Unloading teams, consisting of a signalman and two (2) cargo handlers, assigned to each unloading site.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(15) That ten (10) aircraft plus two (2) spares would be used each day.

(16) That the aircraft would carry three hundred (300) pounds (fifty (50) gallons) of fuel in the rear tank. (Later raised to four hundred twenty five (425) pounds & seventy (70) gallons due to cold weather making the lifting easier),

(17) That Channel DOG (140.58 mcs) would be primary and 3215 kcs would be secondary.

(18) That friendly artillery is located close to the approach route.

(19) That all landing areas were within range of enemy artillery.

(20) That the first five (5) aircraft would take-off from A-17 for ABLE at 0600 at two (2) minute intervals, each with a crew chief, first mechanic and three (3) members of the Air Delivery Platoon. That the second five (5) aircraft would take-off from A-17 for zone BAKER beginning at 0612 at two (2) minute intervals with a similar load. The two (2) spare aircraft would take-off at 0630 for ABLE.

(21) That aircraft at zones ABLE and BAKER would airlift cargo to and unload at all zones simultaneously.

(22) That planes would proceed to zone ABLE after completing the days operation at zone BAKER.

(23) That the crew chief or first mechanic would ride in the cabin and release the external load when the aircraft was over the unloading site, and further be ready to drop the cargo at any time upon order from the pilot.

PHASE II

4. EXECUTION PHASE:

a. No unusual problems were encountered and the operation progressed smoothly and continuously throughout.

b. At 0600, 22 September 1952, all personnel manned their assigned aircraft and took off as scheduled. The operation was continued until all cargo had been delivered and all aircraft and personnel returned to base at 0930. In addition on-call flights were performed from 1300-1400 consisting of Class II and mail (See enclosure (1) for statistics). In general, the same procedure as had been outlined at the briefing was followed; however, two (2) pilots misconstrued the color panels (orange, pink and yellow) and delivered to the wrong sites.

c. Empty oil drums were placed in cargo nets and picked up after dropping assigned loads and returned to zone ABLE expeditiously. Cargo nets were kept at the unloading sites until several were accumulated, then loaded internally or in baskets and returned to zone ABLE. This necessitated frequently landing one (1) plane for pickup which took but very little time.

d. The supported unit operated on 3215 kcs, thus, the helicopter secondary frequency of 3215 kcs became the primary frequency in order to tie in with the ground units.

e. On the second day early morning fog delayed the operation one hour. On the fourth day it rained and made conditions wet and miserable for personnel but the operation was not hindered.

f. The payload was not increased proportionally as the gas load decreased.

g. Ground to air communication difficulties became apparent the first day and the following corrective action was taken:

[REDACTED]

(1) Pilots were instructed to keep their radio volume turned up at all times.

(2) Pilots were called by the flight leader each morning while warming up in order to tune their sets.

(a) Ground to air communication became fair to good.

(b) Ground to air and air to ground communication was found to be unnecessary in the accomplishment of the mission. Ground to ground, however, was very good and used to good advantage frequently.

5. CONCLUSIONS:

a. Upon completion of the operation, all statistical data was compiled, all problems reviewed, and the following conclusions established:

(1) That forty per-cent (40%) of the total effort of this squadron was required to support the 7th Marine Regiment, during this operation. Regular routine flights continued as usual.

(2) That in most instances the maximum payload of the aircraft was not utilized. This resulted from the fact that many types of cargo are not flexible enough in nature to permit cargo to be readily adjusted to meet the assigned payload due to the weight or bulk. On the fourth day, due to rain many cartons were soaked which was extra weight not shown.

(3) The ground to air communication was not needed or used.

(4) That the system of assigning colors to loading and unloading zones was good; however, due to the similarity of the colors displayed, several mistakes were made and two (2) loads taken to the wrong unloading site.

(5) That flying hours were gained by employing refueling sites at both zones ABLE and BAKER. Also by filling the rear tank full (four hundred twenty five (425) pounds) each refueling, instead of three hundred (300) pounds, more flights per gasing were made with no reduction in payload.

(6) That one hundred eighty (180) pounds of payload was sacrificed each trip because the crew chief was required aboard to release the cargo from the static hoist.

(7) That four (4) loads were dropped, one due to cargo rope breaking, the others believed to be faulty hook operation. Nearly all gear was recovered.

(8) That because most pilots of this squadron were familiar with this type operation, and the area in which it was conducted, its efficiency was greatly increased. However, six (6) pilots who recently joined HMR-161 from CONUS were checked out in this immediate area and in this type operation.

(9) That this operation was highly successful in that it was proven feasible to supply MLR Marine Regiments by helicopter, at least, for a short period of time. The operation also furnished the squadron with statistics that will enable it to determine its capabilities in resupplying by helicopter a Marine Regiment or even a Marine Division (Infantry Regiments) in a front line static position with due consideration to its geographical location.

[REDACTED]


6. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. From the experience gained during this operation the following recommendations are submitted:

(1) That a CP or Operations Center be established at a central location to control and coordinate all aspects of the operation. This operation center or CP should have a representative from each participating unit.

(2) That a system be devised that will allow the weight of cargo to be rapidly increased or decreased in increments of fifty (50) pounds each.

(3) That operations of this type be continued possibly supplying two (2) regiments or an artillery regiment, for a five (5) day period.

J. F. Carey
J. F. CAREY

DISTRIBUTION:

CMC
CNO
CINCPACFLT
COMNAVFE
CMCS (5)
CG FMFLANT
CG AIRFMFLANT
CG AIRFMFPAC
PAC FLT COMBAT EVAL BD
CO MAG-16 (3)
CO MAG-26 (4)
CO MAG-36 (4)
CO HMX-1
CG 1STMARDIV (2)
CG 1STMAW
CO MWSS-1

OPERATION HAYLIFT STATISTICS

ABLE (Class I, II, and III)

BAKER (Class V)

	<u>FROM BAKER</u>	<u>FROM ABLE</u>
POUNDS LIFTED	121, 107	211, 184
LOADS LIFTED	124	233
AVERAGE LOAD (POUNDS)	976	906
HOURS OF FLYING (LIFTING) TIME	5 Hrs 30 Min	9 Hrs 4 Min
POUNDS LIFTED PER HOUR	22, 020	21, 999
AVERAGE DISTANCE LIFTED (MILES)	10 (ONE WAY)	10 (ONE WAY)

The distance shown in this enclosure is direct and not the true distance the aircraft flew.

TOTAL AIRCRAFT ASSIGNED DURING THE OPERATION 10

TOTAL AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY DURING THE OPERATION 98%

TOTAL WEIGHT INCLUDES CARGO (8770) POUNDS BROUGHT FROM THE 7th MARINES ON RETURN TRIPS; ALSO INCLUDES SIXTY EIGHT (68) TROOPS AT 12, 240 POUNDS, ONE (1) KIA AT 180 POUNDS AND 7 VIP AT 1260 POUNDS.

VIP MADE INSPECTION FLIGHTS AS FOLLOWS:

Commanding Officer, Service Battalion - - - - - LtCol WARREN
 Prospective Commanding Officer, Service Battalion - - - LtCol LAW
 S-4 Service Battalion - - - - - Capt. MANDENBURG
 USA Transportation Corps Observer - - - - - LtCol NEWTON
 G-4 First Marine Division - - - - - Col. CULHANE
 Ass't G-4 First Marine Division - - - - - LtCol. ATKINSON
 G-4 First Marine Aircraft Wing - - - - - Col CLARK

90 AIR DELIVERY PERSONNEL WERE TRANSPORTED DURING OPERATION HAYLIFT.

GRAND TOTAL

	FLIGHTS	POUNDS	MEN
CLASS I	190	169, 484	
CLASS II	18	15, 955	
CLASS III	25	25, 745	
CLASS IV	RT	250	
CLASS V	124	121, 107	
TROOPS	RT	12, 240	68
MAIL	8	4, 950	
KIA	RT	180	1
	<u>385</u>	<u>349, 911</u>	<u>69</u>

RT RETURN TRIP

ENCLOSURE (1)