

KOREAN WAR PROJECT

NIGHT PATROL ACTION, REPORT OF



HEADQUARTERS
Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
C/O Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California

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From: Commanding General
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps
Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
Troops, Camp Pendleton
Commanding General, 1st Provisional Marine Air-
Ground Task Force, Fleet Marine Force

Subj: Night Patrol Action, report of

Encl: (1) CG 1st MarDiv ltr ser 00327 of 30 Jan 1953

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
/s/ C.F. QUILICI
By direction

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1st Marine Division (Reinf) MAF
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Ser: 00327
30 Jan 1953

From: Commanding General
To: Distribution List

Subj: Night Patrol Action, report of

Encl: (1) "MISSION: To Capture PW", patrol report

1. Enclosure (1) is hereby transmitted for information and retention.

/s/ E.R. SMOAY
By direction

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C O P Y

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"MISSION: To Capture PW"

1. BACKGROUND

This brief narrative deals with the conduct of patrol 114 by the Division Reconnaissance Company. Successful in the accomplishment of its mission, patrol 114 is a good example of the results to be achieved through thorough reconnaissance, detailed planning and complete exercise of control during conduct of operations.

As of mid-January, the lack of prisoners of war had resulted in a lack of up to date information as to details of enemy activity, units and disposition. As a part of an effort to capture PW, the Division Reconnaissance Company was directed to conduct a patrol operation in the general area lying south of Panmunjom and the Peace Corridor. This area, forward of KMC positions, lay along the stream flowing due south from Panmunjom to the SACH'ON. Characterized by flat low terrain consisting of rice paddies and dikes, this area is frequently traversed by the enemy. Reports from air observers, observation posts and friendly agents indicated a general pattern of enemy activity which consisted of patrols, small outposts and layouts.

The mission assigned to the Reconnaissance Company patrol was: "To Capture PW".

2. SELECTION OF OBJECTIVE

After a careful study of the patrol area, including daylight and night reconnaissance and inspection of air photographs, Major D. H. MacDONNELLI, the Reconnaissance Company Commander, selected an objective for the patrol. This objective was a high dike about 1500 meters south of the Peace Corridor and on the west bank of the stream. It was selected as a spot where the enemy was believed to maintain a small outpost.

3. RECONNAISSANCE AND PLAN

Upon selection of the objective, a detailed day and night reconnaissance was effected. Sites for stream crossings and routes of approach and return were selected and a plan was written. The patrol was to be led by Lieutenant James DAY - a veteran of thirty-two previous patrols - and was to consist of himself and thirty-three others. Following previously reconnoitered routes, the patrol was to depart from COP #1 (see Figure 1), travel along the southern edge of the Peace Corridor to a point northwest of TAE-SONG-DONG. Then it was to split. A diversionary and support squad would head southwest to a point on the east bank of the stream across from the objective dike. This group, in charge of Sergeant CHAMBERLAIN, was to wait until the remainder of the patrol reached the vicinity of the objective. The main body was to continue forward, cross the stream then head south to the objective. When this group was in position, the diversionary squad would

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attract attention of the enemy. At this point, the main body was to capture PW whose attention would be directed across the stream towards the diversionary group. Upon seizure of PW, the patrol was to return on order of the Company Commander, located on Nan #1. Communications between the patrol and Nan #1 would be effected by AN/PRG 10. In addition, the elements of the patrol and Nan #1 would also carry AN/PRG 6.

4. CONDUCT OF PATROL

At 2245, on 22 January 1953, patrol 114 departed COP #1 and proceeded as planned (see Figure 1). Upon reaching a designated point northwest of TAESONG-DONG, the support and diversionary squad was detached and moved southwest, taking up positions on the east bank of the stream in the vicinity of the objective. This group carried stretchers for possible evacuation of casualties.

After detachment of the diversionary squad, the remainder of the patrol continued to the previously reconnoitered stream crossing. This group, carrying twelve sub-machine guns, two BARs and six carbines, was delayed by the bright moon and did not cross the stream until 0050. Proceeding westward by bounds, the ambush/assault group traveled about 300 meters to a small stream. Then with the diversionary squad in position, the main body headed south for the objective. The point consisted of two men, Sergeant Donald FIELD and Pfc John L. BOURGEOIS - the latter with experience as point on thirty (30) previous patrols. Following the point at a distance of about twenty-five (25) yards was Platoon Sergeant Stanley W. BOYKO and a radioman with the PRC-6. Ten yards behind was a fire team, followed by the patrol leader, radioman and two riflemen. Two other fire teams brought up the rear. An interval of five yards between men was maintained insofar as possible.

The movement to the south was made by bounds with the last 100 yards of the approach covered by crawling alongside of small dikes running toward the suspected enemy position.

At 0348, approximately fifty yards from the objective, the patrol heard the sound of a bolt "going home". The diversionary group was ordered to make noise and attract attention in that direction. In less than two minutes, two enemy were seen moving toward the ambush group. These men, chattering loudly, apparently directed a phrase to the two point men of the patrol. The patrol leader sang out "TENG I TENG" ("wait a moment"). This apparently satisfied the enemy and one of them moved forward to within five feet of the point. As the Chinese brought his weapon to bear, both point men fired, cutting the enemy below the waist. Immediately, a grenade was thrown which killed the second Chinaman, some twenty yards away.

As the first Chinaman was hit, he got off a short burst from his PPSH type SMG, one round of which glanced off Sergeant FIELD's left temple. Still alive, the enemy was quieted with a carbine stock and dragged back to the main body. Immediately thereafter, the patrol was brought under fire by an estimated 10-15 enemy from a distance of about 50 - 60 yards. Holding

Enclosure (1)

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their fire, the friendlies formed a tight perimeter and waited. The enemy group ceased fire and advanced in skirmish formation.

When the enemy were within ten yards, a concussion grenade was thrown which landed among the friendlies, stunning a radio man. The friendlies opened fire, felling about ten enemy. Return fire was light, supported briefly by a machine gun. A friendly rifle grenade, fired at the machine gun, struck one of the enemy and the remainder retreated immediately. Moving forward, the patrol overran the enemy position. After a hasty investigation during which seven enemy KIA were counted, the patrol withdrew with their prisoner at 0402 on order of the company commander at Nan 1. The withdrawal was made across the stream in the vicinity of the objective, cover being furnished by the support and diversionary group. The patrol closed the MLR at 0445 without further incident. The only friendly casualties were the stunned radio man, the patrol leader and Sergeant FIELD - none wounded seriously.

5. RESULTS


The patrol accomplished its mission, returning with one PW. In addition, casualties were inflicted on the enemy to the extent of 7 KIA counted and 3 KIA estimated.

6. COMMENT

Careful and thorough reconnaissance, detailed planning, painstaking approach, control and exercise of fire discipline paid off for patrol 114. The presence of the patrol leader where he could evaluate the situation and control the patrol permitted him to turn a difficult situation to his advantage.

Enclosure (1)

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KOREA 1:25,000
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- Route
- ⊕ Ambush Location
- Support Squad

Figure 1

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