[D-day, 19 Feb, 1945] [D+1, 20 Feb, 1945] [D+2,21 Feb, 1945] [D+3, 22 Feb, 1945] [D+4, 23 Feb, 1945] [D+5,24 Feb, 1945] [D+6, 25 Feb, 1945] [D+7,26 Feb, 1945] [D+8, 27 Feb, 1945] [D+9, 28 Feb, 1945] [D+10,1 Mar, 1945] [D+11, 2 Mar, 1945] [D+12, 3 Mar, 1945] [D+13,4 Mar, 1945] [D+14, 5 Mar, 1945] [D+15,6 Mar, 1945] [D+16, 7 Mar, 1945] [D+17, 8 Mar, 1945] [D+18, 9 Mar, 1945] [D+19, 10 Mar, 1945] [D+20, 11 Mar, 1945] [D+21, 12 Mar, 1945] [D+22,13 Mar, 1945] [D+23, 14 Mar, 1945] [D+24,15 Mar, 1945] [D+25, 16 Mar, 1945] [D+26, 17 Mar, 1945] [D+27,18 Mar, 1945] [d+28, 19 Mar, 1945] [D+29, 20 Mar, 1945] [D+30,21 Mar, 1945] [D+31, 22 Mar, 1945] [D+32, 23 Mar, 1945] [D+33, 24 Mar, 1945] [D+34, 25 Mar, 1945] [D+35, 26 Mar, 1945]

D+11, 2 March, 1945

9th Marines

    On the morning of 2 March the 2d Bn moved into position on the left of the 1st Bn and the two battalions attacked abreast at 0800.  This attack was preceded by 30 minutes each of NGF and artillery preparation.  Both battalions were able to move forward initially, but were stopped soon by intense enemy fire.  Another attack by both battalions at 1530 the same day, this also preceded by artillery and NGF barrages, netted only small gains, the result again of heavy small arms fire from the front and right front.  At intervals intense enemy mortar and artillery fire fell on the attackers and inflicted numerous casualties.  Supporting artillery was drawn in close to the front lines in an attempt to alleviate the fire, but enemy MG positions even closer to the front lines than artillery could safely be placed continued to pin down the attacking elements.  Tanks from Co C 3d Tank Bn supporting the 1st Bn succeeded in knocking out a number of enemy installations late in the afternoon of this day.

21st Marines

K. 2 Mar.  One Co 1st Bn released from 2d Bn and reverted to parent organization.  The Reg continued the Atk at 0800 with 3d Bn 9th Mar and 1st Bn 21st Mar abreast.  Little or no progress was made by the 1st Bn 21st Mar due to heavy enemy MG and direct AT fire covering the east-west runway of the Airfield No 3, 3d Bn 9th Mar made steady progress and after heavy continuous fighting reached Hill 362 (235 U).  At 1525 the 2d Bn was placed in position at 218 A, F and jumped off in the Atk to Hill 357 (218 D) at 1530.  After two hours of continuous fighting the 2d Bn held a line extending from 218 B to 218 L; contact with 2d Bn 9th Mar was established on the left; One Co 1st Bn 21st Mar was utilized to tie in with 9th Mar on the right.  Remainder of 1st Bn 21st Mar established RRL at 217 X,Y.  Elements of 26th Mar in and along the left Regtl ZofA established contact with 3d Bn 9th Mar.  The following general line was held during the night: 217 E, 218 A,B,F,K,P,Q.  Intense enemy mortar, MG and AT fire was received along the entire front during the night causing numerous casualties.

23 Marines

DOG PLUS ELEVEN, 2 MARCH, 1945

    The only evidence of enemy activity during the night in the RCT area was an occasional round of mortar or light artillery falling outside the perimeter of the assembly area.  At about 2315, Division Operation Order 11-45 was received, assigning a continuation of reserve status to the RCT less BLTs 2/23 and 3/23.  Instructions based on this order were issued verbally to the lower units of RCT prior to 2400.  2/23 remained as VAC reserve at TA 165 BC, and 3/23 remained attached to RCT 25 with no change in the assignment of companies from the previous day.  Co K remained under 3/23 control and continued mopping-up operations of the cliffline at 183 INO.  The same attachments of tanks and 75 mm Halftracks were assigned for use of Co K in this area.  Despite the fact that sniper was intense and extremely accurate, considerable progress was made in reducing the enemy resistance.  Small local counterattacks of groups of six to seven Japs were encountered and were systematically destroyed.  Anti-sniper patrols were maintained in the rear areas, and the caves in the vicinity of 183 QR were completely mopped up by the use of War Dogs and engineer demolition teams.  BLT 1/23 executed reconnaissance of routes of approach to the zones of action of RCT 24 and RCT 25, prepared to move on thirty minutes notice in support of either RCT in the Division zone.  There was no change in CP or units areas.

24th Marines

 2 March, 1945

    Sporadic enemy fire was received along the front from 0001 until dawn.  Orders were received from Division to continue the attack at King-Hour (0800) with RCT 25 remaining on the right of RCT 24.  RCT 24 changed the boundaries between BLTs in order to change the direction of attack to the southeast and thus attack down the corridors instead of across them.  The RCT was to attack with BLT 3/24 (less Company L) with 4 tanks attached on the left, BLT 2/24 with 4 tanks and the 2d Sec, 1st Provisional Rocket Detachment attached, making the main effort in the center and BLT 1/24 on the right.  BLT 1/24 would be pinched out as the others progressed and then moved to an assembly area.  Company L, BLT 3/24 remained in RCT Reserve.  3/14 reinforced by 2/14 was in direct support of RCT 24.  An artillery preparation preceded the attack. The attack jumped off at 0800 but little progress was made initially because of heavy mortar, automatic weapons and rifle fire.  Small gains were made throughout the day all along the line except in the vicinity of HILL 382 where the bitter opposition continued.  By 1700 when units were ordered to consolidate for the night the left flank of BLT 2/24 and the right flank of BLT 3/24 had advanced approximately 300 yards.  one platoon of Company L was committed in the zone of BLT 3/24 to fill a gap in the line. There was a small enemy counterattack during the early part of the night in the zone of BLT 2/24.  Approximately 30 enemy were killed and the remainder of the period was quiet.

25th Marines

D plus 11, 2 March 1945.

    The night of 1-2 March was relatively quiet with only moderate infiltration attempts and light sporadic mortar and artillery fire.  RCT-25 (BLT?3/23 attached) continued the attack commencing at 0630.  BLT-1/25 on the left attempted to infiltrate and seize the high ground to the north of Turkey Knob by jumping off at K minus 90 (K-hour 0800) without the normal preparatory fire in the hope that the enemy would be caught of guard.  For the first 15 minutes this was successful but at approximately 0650 the enemy opened up with mortar and rocket barrages and intense MG and sniper fire.  by 1430 troops on either side of the gap were within 65 yards of each other, however at 1445 the enemy opened up with a murderous mortar and rocket barrage and with all available small arms and Co B on the right of the gap was forced to pull back having suffered over 30 casualties.

In the center, BLT-2/25 was ordered to extend its left flank to assist the advance of Co B on its left and the one Co of BLT-3/23 (RCT Res) was attached for that purpose.  The left flank attempted to move out with Co B at 0800 but was unable to make any appreciable progress.  In the center of BLT?2/25, a frontal advance of nearly 200 yards was made.  BLT-3/25 on the fight flank  commencing at 1630, made an advance along the coast of approximately 300 yards against no opposition.  BLT-3/23 remained in the RCT Res and continued to mop up resistance to the west of Turkey Knob that had originally been bypassed.  The Co that had been attached to BLT-2/25 was not committed during the day and was returned to BLT-3/23 at 1700.  At 1700 positions were ordered consolidated for the night and BLT-1/25 was again forced to fall back from its untenable position to make contact with the unit on its left which had not moved throughout the day.  Positions were consolidated and firm contact was made along the line prior to darkness.

26th Marines

D+11, 2 mar 45 Weather Partly cloudy, visibility good.

    CT attacked with LT 326 in assault at 0800.  Lt 126 in CT reserve moved to a forward position of readiness about 1100.  Between 1000 and 1400 two companies of LT 226 were committed to action to maintain contact between LT 326 and CT 28 on our left.  About 1400 LT 226 was moved to right flank to relieve 3rdMarDiv elements in our zone of action and tie in with right flank of LT 326; reserve company to move at once, remaining companies to disengage and to follow.  At 1400 LT 126 moved to close gap and tie in lines between LT 326 and CT 28.  The rocket section was attached to LT 326 during the day.  Accurate AT fire prevented successful tank support of LT 326.
Road system was pushed well forward by this date, and for the remainder of the operation attached engineers kept usual roads pushed right to front lines (and often ahead of front lines).
Casualties                         4 Off,      46 Enl.
Replacements:                  2 Off,      58 Enl.
Effective Strength:        114 Off,  2486 Enl.

27th Marines

D plus 11 2 March, 1945

    This combat team continued to be division reserve.
A dog-tag of Miya 7837 unit was found.  This unit was not identified.
A number of enemy machine guns and other infantry weapons were captured by our units which are at present in division reserve.

    At 2130, there was a FLASH RED.  No planes appeared in our area.
Enemy dead reported to date was 1047.
28th Marines

28th Marines

1800, 1 March to 1800, 2 March.

Night Activity:  Sporadic enemy mortar fire during the night.

Daylight Operations:  Ordered by Division to continue the attack to O-3 at 0800.

    The attack jumped off on time with LT's in the same position on the line as of 1 March.  The scheme of maneuver was for LT-128 and LT-228 to attack around the right and left of sides of Hill 362, and join on the north side. LT-328 was to continue up the west coast on LT-228's left.

    An Anti-tank ditch ran perpendicular to the hill across the open area to the north of it, thereby making it impossible to get tanks into position where they could support the infantry.  An armored dozer was brought up and made a passage through the ditch at about 1300 enabling a platoon of tanks to get through.  At the same time a company of LT-228 rushed across the open area to the next cliff line to the north where LT-228 would contact LT-128.  All broke loose and the company suffered heavy casualties from fire coming from the cliff line to the north, the cliff line on the north side of Hill 362, and a blockhouse on the flat ground in front of and to the east of 362.

    At 1400, Lt. Col Johnson, commanding LT-228 was killed and Major Pearce took command.  Major Finch of Regimental Weapons Company was transferred to LT-228 as Executive Officer.

    At 1530 a local counter-attack was launched against LT-128, but was repulsed with 149 Japs being killed.

    By late afternoon LT-228 had squeezed out H Co, of LT-328, on the left.  H Co, was moved to an area just north of Hill 362 as CT reserve.

    By 1700 most of the enemy had been destroyed on and around 362.  LT-328 had made steady gains on the left and the lines for the night were on D-A on the left and 50 yards shot of D-A on the right.

    At 1010, LT-328 reported the enemy using a greenish yellow gas which caused the men to vomit and left them with severe headaches for about two hours afterwards.  The gas was fired from 50mm mortars, and as soon as a few gas shells exploded, H. E. was apparently fired with the idea of spreading the gas more rapidly and also killing our men as they ran to escape the gas.  A complete report was made to Division.

CP's:  LT-128 in 199 B, LT-228 in 216 P, LT-328 in 198 O.
 

Casualties for period:   Supporting units for period

                      OFF        ENL

KIA & DOW      2         57   2 destroyers, 1 LC(S)
WIA                  2       183   2d Bn, 13th Marines
SK (evac)                     11   B & C Co's, 5th Tank Bn.
TOTAL            4        251

Combat efficiency:  60%
 

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